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CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, RULINGS, AND RELATED CASES
Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellants makes the following certificate pursuant to
D.C. Circuit Rule 28(a):
A.

Parties, amici, and intervenors
The following list includes all parties who appeared in the district court and

who appear in this Court:
Plaintiffs-Appellants

Defendants-Appellees

Margaret Peggy Lee Mead
(no longer a party to this appeal)

Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General of
the United States, in his official capacity

Charles Edward Lee

United States Department of Health and
Human Services

Susan Seven-Sky
Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of the
United States Department of Health and
Human Services, in her official capacity

Kenneth Ruffo
Gina Rodriguez

United States
Treasury

Department

of

the

Timothy F. Geithner, Secretary of the
United States Department of the
Treasury, in his official capacity
No amici or intervenor appeared in the district court proceedings. Mountain
States Legal Foundation and Judicial Watch, Inc., have indicated their intention to
participate as amici curiae before this Court.
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Rulings Under Review
Plaintiffs-Appellants are appealing from the final decision and supporting

memorandum opinion of District Judge Gladys Kessler entered on February 22,
2011, granting Defendants-Appellees’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint.
JA 101-66.

The memorandum opinion appears on Lexis with the following

citation: Mead v. Holder, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18592 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011).
C.

Related Cases
This case was never previously before this Court, or any other court, other

than the district court from which this case has been appealed.

Plaintiffs-

Appellants are not aware of any cases pending in this Court that involve the same
parties or substantially the same issues or any such cases previously before this
Court. Plaintiffs-Appellants provide the following list of cases, of which they are
aware, that involve substantially the same or similar issue(s) as this appeal and that
are currently pending before other federal courts:
Court Name

Case Name

Docket Number

U.S. District Court
for the District of
Columbia

Association of American
Physicians & Surgeons
v.
Sebelius

1:10-cv-499-RJL

U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit

Virginia
v.
Sebelius

11-1057 & 11-1058
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U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit

Liberty University
v.
Geithner

10-2347

U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit

TMLC
v.
Obama

10-2388

U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit

U.S. Citizens Association
v.
Obama

11-3327

U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit

Kinder
v.
Department of Treasury

11-1973

U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit

Florida
v.
U.S. Department of Health
& Human Services

11-11021 &
11-11067

U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District
of Oklahoma

Oklahoma
v.
Sebelius

6:11-cv-30-RAW

U.S. District Court
for the Northern District
of Ohio

U.S. Citizen Association
v.
Obama

5:10-cv-1065-DDD

U.S. District Court
for the Middle District
of Pennsylvania

Goudy-Bachman
v.
U.S. Department of Health
& Human Services

1:10-cv-763-CCC
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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 26.1 and D.C. Circuit Rule 26.1, counsel for
Plaintiffs-Appellants certifies that there are no non-governmental corporate parties
to these proceedings.
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This case involves a facial challenge to Section 1501 of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”)1/, which requires most Americans,
including Plaintiffs, to buy and indefinitely maintain approved health insurance or
pay annual penalties (also known as the individual mandate), and arises under the
United States Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq., and 28
U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202. The district court had original jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’
claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1346. This Court has jurisdiction over
this appeal from a final decision of the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
The district court entered a final decision dismissing all of Plaintiffs’ claims
with prejudice on February 22, 2011. JA 101-02. The order states: “[t]his is a
final appealable Order subject to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4.” JA 102.
Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal on February 25, 2011. JA 167-68; Fed. R.
App. P. 4(a)(1)(B).

1

/ 111 Pub. L. No. 148, 124 Stat. 119, 111th Cong., 2d Sess., Mar. 23, 2010,
as amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act (“HCERA”), 111
Pub. L. No. 152, 124 Stat. 1029, 111th Cong., 2d Sess., Mar. 30, 2010. Section
1501 is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18091 and 26 U.S.C. § 5000A. The most relevant
sections of these statutes are provided in the Addendum and at JA 55-78.
1
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.

Whether the PPACA’s individual mandate, which requires most

Americans to buy and indefinitely maintain approved health insurance or pay
annual penalties, is unconstitutional because it exceeds Congress’s authority under
the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses of Article I of the United States
Constitution.
II.

Whether, as a matter of first impression, the power “[t]o regulate

commerce . . . among the several States,” U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, empowers
Congress to regulate the “mental activity” of Americans (e.g., the decision not to
enter the market for health insurance), as the district court so concluded, and
require those individuals who have declined to purchase health insurance to buy
and indefinitely maintain health insurance or pay annual penalties.
III.

Whether requiring Plaintiffs Seven-Sky and Lee to either indefinitely

maintain health insurance or pay annual penalties violates their rights under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND THE CASE
Section 1501 requires Plaintiffs and many other lawful United States
residents to buy and indefinitely maintain health insurance under the threat of
annual financial penalties. The section begins with a series of findings that focus
exclusively upon the purported Commerce Clause authority to impose the
2
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“individual responsibility requirement,” that is, the requirement that every person
buy and indefinitely maintain health insurance.

§ 1501(a), as amended by §

10106(a); JA 47-48, 56-58, 64-66. The first substantive provision of Section 1501
is the individual mandate, which states that “[a]n applicable individual shall for
each month beginning after 2013 ensure that the individual, and any dependent of
the individual who is an applicable individual, is covered under minimum essential
coverage for such month.” § 1501(b), at § 5000A(a); JA 44-45, 58.
Under the heading of “shared responsibility payment,” a separate subsection
of Section 1501 imposes a “penalty” upon a taxpayer for each applicable
individual within his or her household who lacks health insurance coverage. §
1501(b), at § 5000A(b)(1), as amended by § 10106(b)(1); JA 45, 58, 66. The
“administration and procedure” subsection of Section 1501 creates “special rules”
to ensure that key traditional methods of tax enforcement are not available to
collect the individual mandate penalty. § 1501(b), at § 5000A(g); JA 47, 63.
Section 1501 sets a “flat dollar amount” of the penalty per uninsured person per
year—$95 in 2014, $325 in 2015, $695 in 2016 and later years (increased in 2017
and later years in relation to cost-of-living adjustments)—although the amount
may be raised or lowered in certain circumstances. § 1501(b), at § 5000A(c), as
amended by § 10106(b)(2), (3), and as amended by HCERA § 1002; JA 46-47, 5860, 66-67, 76-77.
3
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Section 1501 excludes certain persons from the definition of “applicable
individual” and provides a few exemptions. § 1501(b), at § 5000A(d), (e), as
amended by § 10106(c), (d), and as amended by HCERA § 1002(b); JA 45, 60-62,
67, 76-77. None of these provisions excuse Plaintiffs from having to comply with
the individual mandate. See id. Also, the PPACA does not include a severability
provision.
Plaintiffs are United States citizens who do not currently have health
insurance and do not want or need such insurance. JA 48-50. It is highly likely
that each Plaintiff will be required to either buy and indefinitely maintain health
insurance or pay annual penalties beginning in 2014. JA 49. For example, it is
highly likely that Plaintiff Rodriguez will be required to pay, at a minimum,
$11,685 in penalties on behalf of herself and her household through 2020. JA 51.
As a direct result of the individual mandate’s inevitable impact upon Plaintiffs’
finances and lifestyle, they are compelled to adjust their finances now, by setting
aside money, and will continue to do so to pay the annual penalties. JA 50-52. As
a result, Plaintiffs will be unable to use or set aside that money for other purposes
now, directly limiting their ability to plan for the future prudently. Id.
Plaintiffs alleged in their Amended Complaint that Section 1501 is
unconstitutional because it exceeds Congress’s power under Article I of the United
States Constitution, and that the entire PPACA is invalid because Section 1501 is
4
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not severable. JA 33-36, 38, 42. Plaintiffs Seven-Sky and Lee also alleged that the
individual mandate violates their rights protected by RFRA. JA 37-38. The
district court held that Plaintiffs have standing to bring their claims, which are ripe
for review, because they have alleged a substantial probability that they will be
subject to the individual mandate in 2014 and beyond, which directly impacts their
present spending and financial planning.2/ JA 115-27. Defendants waived their
jurisdictional arguments in a notice filed with the district court. JA 98.
Regarding the merits, the district court concluded that the individual
mandate was a valid exercise of the powers to regulate commerce and to make
laws necessary and proper to the exercise of the commerce power based primarily
upon four determinations: 1) Congress can regulate an individual’s “mental
activity” of deciding not to buy health insurance, which substantially affects
interstate commerce; 2) inevitably, all individuals will take part in the health care
market, which Congress can regulate; 3) some uninsured individuals will receive
health care services that they cannot pay for, the costs of which are shifted to
others; and 4) the individual mandate is necessary to prevent the PPACA’s other
sections from causing negative consequences. JA 140-57. The court also held,
however, that the taxing power does not authorize Section 1501 because “Congress
2

/ The district court concluded that Plaintiff Mead lacked standing because
she would likely be covered under Medicare, JA 115-17, but Mead is not a party to
this appeal.
5
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did not intend the mandatory payment . . . to act as a revenue-raising tax, but rather
as a punitive measure.” JA 159.
In addition, the court rejected the RFRA claims, holding that the ability to
pay annual penalties in lieu of maintaining health insurance negates the existence
of any substantial burden upon Plaintiff Seven-Sky and Lee’s religious exercise,
and also holding that the individual mandate was the least restrictive means of
achieving the compelling government interests of safeguarding public health and
increasing health insurance coverage. JA 163-66. This timely appeal by Plaintiffs
followed.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The individual mandate is unconstitutional because it exceeds even the
outermost bounds of Congress’s Article I authority and is inconsistent with the
constitutional system of dual sovereignty that divides power between the federal
and State governments. Under the Commerce Clause, Congress cannot “regulate”
inactivity by requiring individuals to buy a good or service as a condition of their
lawful residence in the United States, and Congress does not have carte blanche to
include unconstitutional provisions within a larger scheme of commercial
regulation. Although Congress may regulate local economic activity that, when
coupled with similar activity, substantially affects interstate commerce, it cannot
regulate an entire group (uninsured individuals) because a small subset of that
6
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group will, at some point in the future, engage in a class of economic activities
within Congress’s power to regulate (receiving health care without paying for it).
In addition, that virtually all Americans will participate in broadly defined
markets at some point during their lifetimes (health care, housing, transportation,
food, etc.) does not authorize Congress to regulate all Americans indefinitely
without any connection to a specific, voluntary commercial or economic activity.
The power to regulate an interstate market extends to those who voluntarily enter it
during the duration of their participation in that market; that power does not
authorize Congress to regulate non-participating individuals now based upon
speculation about what they may do in the future.
The novel arguments offered in support of the individual mandate are not
subject to any meaningful limiting principle and, if accepted, would eviscerate the
Constitution’s system of dual sovereignty and limited, enumerated federal powers.
Similarly, the Necessary and Proper Clause, often resorted to as “the last,
best hope of those who defend ultra vires congressional action,” Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 923 (1997), does not support the individual mandate. A
principal justification offered for the individual mandate is the need to avoid
numerous negative consequences that the PPACA’s other provisions would cause
absent the mandate to buy insurance. Accepting this reasoning would transform
the Necessary and Proper Clause from a modest means of carrying out the
7
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enforcement of federal laws tied to an enumerated power into an unwieldy vehicle
for Congress to pass statutes containing provisions that would have negative
effects coupled with otherwise unconstitutional provisions to mitigate those
negative effects.
Moreover, the claim that the individual mandate is necessary to achieve a
goal within Congress’s authority is merely the beginning of the inquiry, not the
end; to be valid the law must also be proper—“appropriate” and “consist[ent] with
the letter and spirit of the constitution.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). Given the wide-ranging implications of the arguments
offered in support of the individual mandate for our system of dual sovereignty, the
fact that the Commerce Clause does not authorize the individual mandate
demonstrates that the mandate also exceeds the scope of the Necessary and Proper
Clause.
Furthermore, the individual mandate violates RFRA as applied to Plaintiffs
Seven-Sky and Lee. The Amended Complaint sets forth a plausible claim that the
individual mandate substantially burdens their religious exercise by requiring them
to either indefinitely maintain health insurance, which they sincerely believe would
violate their religious belief that God will protect them from illness or injury, or
pay annual penalties for declining to violate their faith. Defendants, moreover,
cannot meet their burden of demonstrating that applying the individual mandate to
8
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Seven-Sky and Lee is the least restrictive means of furthering any compelling
government interest.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE PPACA’S INDIVIDUAL MANDATE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
IT EXCEEDS CONGRESS’S AUTHORITY UNDER ARTICLE I OF
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
“The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers. See

U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8. As James Madison wrote, ‘the powers delegated by the
proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those
which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.’”
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (quoting The Federalist No. 45).
The Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of dual sovereignty, observing
that “the Constitution protects us from our own best intentions: It divides power
among sovereigns and among branches of government precisely so that we may
resist the temptation to concentrate power in one location as an expedient solution
to the crisis of the day.” New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187 (1992); see
also U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“Federalism was our Nation’s own discovery. The Framers split the
atom of sovereignty. It was the genius of their idea that our citizens would have
two political capacities, one State and one federal, each protected from incursion
by the other.”).
9
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The individual mandate exceeds the few and defined powers of Congress,
including those provided by the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses. It
is, therefore, unconstitutional.
Review of the district court’s dismissal of the constitutional claims under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is de novo. Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 676
(D.C. Cir. 2008).
A.

The individual mandate is not authorized by the Commerce
Clause.

Congress has the power “[t]o regulate commerce . . . among the several
States.” U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8. Although the scope of this power has been
broadened from the original understanding of a power to “prescribe the rule by
which commerce is to be governed,” Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196
(1824), the Supreme Court has consistently held that Congress’s exercise of this
power is limited.
Although federal statutes are presumed to be constitutional, United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000), the unprecedented nature of the individual
mandate is strong evidence that the Commerce Clause does not authorize Congress
to require an individual to buy something. In Printz, the Supreme Court observed
that “[t]he utter lack of statutes imposing obligations on the States’ executive
(notwithstanding the attractiveness of that course to Congress), suggests an
assumed absence of such power.” 521 U.S. at 907-08; see also id. at 905 (“if . . .
10
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earlier Congresses avoided use of this highly attractive power, we would have
reason to believe that the power was thought not to exist.”); id. at 918 (finding
significant the “almost two centuries of apparent congressional avoidance of the
practice.”); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct.
3138, 3159 (2010) (agreeing that “[p]erhaps the most telling indication of the
severe constitutional problem with the PCAOB is the lack of historical precedent
for this entity.”).
Similarly, the individual mandate “forge[s] new ground and extends the
Commerce Clause powers beyond its current high water mark.”

Virginia v.

Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 775 (E.D. Va. 2010). “Never before has Congress
required that everyone buy a product from a private company (essentially for life)
just for being alive and residing in the United States.” Florida v. U.S. Dep’t
Health & Human Servs., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, at *71-72 (N.D. Fla. 2011).
For the reasons set forth below, the individual mandate exceeds the outer bounds
of the Commerce Clause.
1.

Lopez and Morrison emphasize that Congress may regulate
voluntary economic activity, but the individual mandate
regulates a person’s inactivity.

The individual mandate applies to all individuals lawfully present in the
United States who have not been given an exemption. The requirement to buy and
indefinitely maintain health insurance, or indefinitely pay annual penalties, is not
11
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triggered by the occurrence of any event or activity. As one district court noted in
another case involving the PPACA, “[t]he threshold question . . . is whether
activity is required before Congress can exercise its power under the Commerce
Clause.” Id. at *74. Another district court accurately observed that “[n]either the
Supreme Court nor any federal circuit court of appeals has extended Commerce
Clause powers to compel an individual to involuntarily enter the stream of
commerce by purchasing a commodity in the private market.” Virginia, 728 F.
Supp. 2d at 782.
A purported exercise of the Commerce Clause power must be predicated
upon the regulation of existing, voluntary commercial or economic activity to be
valid—not the failure to purchase a product. Because the individual mandate
applies to individuals regardless of whether they are presently engaged in any
specific commercial or economic activity, it exceeds the Commerce Clause power.
As such, the district court erred in holding that the individual mandate regulates
“an economic activity: deciding whether or not to purchase health insurance.” JA
140-41.
District courts considering challenges to the individual mandate have
recognized that prior cases upholding regulation under the Commerce Clause have

12
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involved existing physical economic activity.3/ The fact that Supreme Court cases
upholding statutes based on the Commerce Clause have all involved the regulation
of existing commercial or economic activities is not a mere coincidence. Lopez
and Morrison illustrate that the requirement of voluntary commercial or economic
activity is derived from the Commerce Clause’s text and history as well as the
important constitutional principle of dual sovereignty.
a.

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)

In Lopez, the Supreme Court held that the Gun Free School Zones Act,
which prohibited the possession of a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school,
exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause authority because it was a law that “ha[d]
nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise, however
broadly one might define those terms.”

514 U.S. at 561.

The Lopez Court

reiterated that the Commerce Clause “‘must be considered in the light of our dual
system of government and may not be extended so as to . . . effectually obliterate
the distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely
centralized government.’” Id. at 557 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).
3

/ See, e.g, JA 147 (“previous Commerce Clause cases have all involved
physical activity, as opposed to mental activity, i.e., decision-making”); TMLC v.
Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107416, at *23 (E.D. Mich.
2010); Florida, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, at *74-75; Virginia, 728 F. Supp. 2d
at 771.
13
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The Court identified three “categories of activity” that the Commerce Clause
authorizes Congress to regulate, including “activities . . . that substantially affect
interstate commerce,” the only category relevant here. Id. at 558-59. The Court
summarized previous cases dealing with this category as holding that, “[w]here
economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating
that activity will be sustained.” Id. at 560 (emphasis added). The Court concluded
that the Act exceeded Congress’s authority because possessing a gun in a school
zone was not economic activity, nor was the Act “an essential part of a larger
regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut
unless the intrastate activity were regulated.” Id. at 561.
The government argued that Congress may regulate non-economic activity
(possessing guns in a school zone) that, in the aggregate, substantially affects
interstate commerce. Of note, the government cited the cost-shifting impact on the
insurance system, arguing that gun possession may lead to violent crime, and “the
costs of violent crime are substantial, and, through the mechanism of insurance,
those costs are spread throughout the population.” Id. at 563-64. In rejecting these
arguments, the Court responded by stating:
We pause to consider the implications of the Government’s
arguments. The Government admits . . . that Congress could regulate
not only all violent crime, but all activities that might lead to violent
crime . . . . [as well as] any activity that it found was related to the
economic productivity of individual citizens: family law (including
marriage, divorce, and child custody), for example. . . . Under the
14
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theories that the Government presents . . . it is difficult to perceive any
limitation on federal power. . . . Thus, if we were to accept the
Government’s arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity by
an individual that Congress is without power to regulate.
Id. (emphasis added).
The Court noted that the Constitution “withhold[s] from Congress a plenary
police power that would authorize enactment of every type of legislation,” id. at
566, and stated,
[t]o uphold the Government’s contentions here, we would have to pile
inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general
police power of the sort retained by the States. . . . [That] would
require us to conclude that the Constitution’s enumeration of powers
does not presuppose something not enumerated, . . . and that there
never will be a distinction between what is truly national and what is
truly local. This we are unwilling to do.
Id. at 567-68 (citations omitted); see also id. at 577-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(noting the importance of federalism principles in Commerce Clause
interpretation).
The individual mandate does not withstand scrutiny under Lopez. Being
lawfully present within the United States, like possessing a gun within 1,000 feet
of a school, is not a commercial or economic activity that substantially affects
interstate commerce.

No support exists for the assertion that the power to

“‘prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed’” includes the power to
force those who do not want to engage in a commercial or economic activity to do
15
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so. See id. at 553 (quoting Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196). As in Lopez, “[t]o uphold the
Government’s contentions here [would require] . . . convert[ing] congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained
by the States.” Id. at 567.
b.

United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)

Morrison also demonstrates that the individual mandate exceeds Congress’s
power. There, the Court held that Section 13981 of the Violence Against Women
Act, which provided a civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence, was
unconstitutional because “[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any
sense of the phrase, economic activity.” 529 U.S. at 613. Congress found that
gender-motivated violence substantially affects interstate commerce, id. at 615, but
the Court rejected the argument “that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent
criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate
commerce.” Id. at 617-18. The Court observed that cases in which it had upheld
an assertion of Commerce Clause authority due to the regulated activity’s
substantial effect on interstate commerce involved the regulation of “commerce,”
an “economic enterprise,” “economic activity,” or “some sort of economic
endeavor.” Id. at 610-11.
Like Lopez, Morrison further illustrates that the individual mandate exceeds
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority. Accepting the government’s arguments
16
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would lead to a federal police power allowing Congress—for the first time—to
mandate a host of purchases by individuals.
After Morrison was decided, this Court upheld the application of the
Endangered Species Act to a proposed housing development that would jeopardize
the existence of the arroyo southwestern toad. The Court reaffirmed the necessity
of examining whether the regulation targets economic activity, stating that “[t]he
first Lopez factor is whether the regulated activity has anything ‘to do with
‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define
those terms.’” Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1068 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561). This Court declined to decide whether the
absence of economic activity would be dispositive, or merely one factor to
consider, because the construction of a housing development was an economic
activity. Id. at 1072.
Rancho Viejo reaffirms that whether the regulated activity is economic in
nature is at least one factor to consider,4/ casting doubt upon dicta from D.C.
Circuit cases decided before Morrison suggesting that the Commerce Clause

4

/ See also Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1158, 1160 (D.C.
Cir. 2003) (opinions of Chief Judge Sentelle and now-current Supreme Court Chief
Justice Roberts dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc, noting that the
majority’s interpretation of the Commerce Clause was more expansive than the
Supreme Court’s).
17
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allows Congress to regulate non-economic activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce.5/
The individual mandate is unconstitutional because it does not regulate
voluntary economic activity; declining to enter a commercial transaction is not the
equivalent of entering a commercial transaction.
c.

The individual mandate exceeds the Commerce
Clause power because it does not regulate existing
commercial or economic activity.

Through the individual mandate, Congress sought to obscure entirely the
distinction between activity and inactivity, stating that Section 1501 “regulates
activity that is commercial and economic in nature:

economic and financial

decisions about how and when health care is paid for, and when health insurance is
purchased.” § 1501(a)(2)(A), as amended by § 10106(a); JA 64 (emphasis added).
Put differently, Congress asserted that being lawfully present in the United States
without health insurance is itself economic activity that Congress can regulate. The
district court accepted this argument, stating:

5

/ Navegar v. United States, 192 F.3d 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (upholding a
statute prohibiting the manufacture, transfer, and possession of semi-automatic
assault weapons); Nat’l Assoc. of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) (upholding the application of the Endangered Species Act to the
construction of a hospital); Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(upholding the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act’s prohibition of
activities preventing access to abortion clinics).
18
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this Court finds the distinction [between regulating activity and
inactivity], which Plaintiffs rely on heavily, to be of little significance.
It is pure semantics to argue that an individual who makes a choice to
forgo health insurance is not “acting,” especially given the serious
economic and health-related consequences to every individual of that
choice. Making a choice is an affirmative action, whether one decides
to do something or not do something. They are two sides of the same
coin. To pretend otherwise is to ignore reality.
JA 147. In other words, deciding not to buy something is “mental activity” that
Congress can regulate. Id. The district court incorporated this reasoning into its
legal analysis, asking “whether the decision not to purchase health insurance is an
‘economic’ one, like the activities in Wickard and Gonzales, or a ‘non-economic’
one like those in Lopez and Morrison.” JA 137 (emphasis added).
The district court’s conclusion that “[i]t is pure semantics” to differentiate
between actual economic conduct and the failure to buy a product is flawed for
several reasons. See JA 147. First,
“economic decisions” are a much broader and far-reaching category
than are “activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.” . . .
Every person throughout the course of his or her life makes hundreds
or even thousands of life decisions that involve the same general sort
of thought process that the defendants maintain is “economic
activity.” There will be no stopping point if that should be deemed
the equivalent of activity for Commerce Clause purposes.
Florida, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, at *102. Some decisions lead to economic
activity within Congress’s power to regulate, while many more decisions lead to
non-economic activity, or inactivity, that is not within Congress’s power to
regulate.
19
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American adults decide daily whether to spend money on an array of goods
and services. A person may choose to buy X and not Y. Under the district court’s
reasoning, so long as Congress has the authority to regulate the interstate market
for Y (which is often the case), it can mandate that all individuals purchase Y.
Congress would merely need to assert that the “mental activity” of deciding not to
purchase Y is economic in nature, and that the failure to buy Y substantially affects
interstate commerce. For example, Congress could cite its authority to regulate
banking to justify a mandate that all individuals maintain a certain amount of
money in a bank account or pay a penalty. In short, the government’s defense of
the individual mandate, which was adopted by the district court, “rests on a twisted
revision of Descartes’ syllogism: ‘I think (about commerce), therefore I am
(engaging in commerce).’”

Brief for Revere America Foundation as Amicus

Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs at 30, Liberty University v. Geithner, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 125922 (W.D. Va. 2010) (No. 6:10-cv-00015-nkm).
Second, the district court cited “serious economic and health-related
consequences to every individual” resulting from a failure to buy health insurance
as a justification for Congress to mandate the purchase of health insurance. JA
147. Any failure to purchase something will have consequences for both the
person declining to make the purchase and those who are voluntary market

20
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participants, yet that is a woefully inadequate (and unprecedented) basis for
Congressional regulation.
There is quite literally no decision that, in the natural course of events,
does not have an economic impact of some sort. The decisions of
whether and when (or not) to buy a house, a car, a television, a dinner,
or even a morning cup of coffee also have a financial impact that—
when aggregated with similar economic decisions—affect the price of
that particular product or service and have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.
Florida, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, at *98.

In addition, addressing the

perceived “health-related consequences” of an individual’s actions is particularly
within the purview of the States’ police powers, not Congress’s power.
Third, although at times a person’s failure to buy a particular product is the
result of a deliberate decision-making process, far more often, the individual has
not contemplated buying the particular product at all. There is a vast and diverse
array of services and products available for sale, many of which an individual will
never make an active decision not to purchase. As has been observed, “it is ‘a
remarkable exaggeration of [the] rational aspects of human nature’ to claim that
the uninsured (as a rule) make structured and calculated decisions to forego
insurance . . . as opposed to simply not having it.” Id. at *96-97. The progression
from a Congressional power to regulate commerce among the several States to a
power to regulate a person’s failure to buy a good or service, even one that the

21
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person has never thought about, is staggering, and bears no connection to the
Commerce Clause’s text or the Constitution’s system of dual sovereignty.
In light of these principles, federal judges in Florida and Virginia have
correctly held that the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to regulate ongoing
commercial or economic activity in some circumstances, not mere “mental
activity” or decisions. “If some type of already-existing activity or undertaking
were not considered to be a prerequisite to the exercise of commerce power, we
would go beyond the concern articulated in Lopez for it would be virtually
impossible to posit anything that Congress would be without power to regulate.”
Id. at *80; accord Virginia, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 781. These judges also rightly
concluded that the individual mandate is ultra vires because it does not regulate
existing commercial or economic activity. Id.
2.

Wickard and Raich do not suggest that Congress’s authority
to regulate local economic activity, as an essential part of a
national scheme to regulate that activity, gives rise to a
newly-minted power to force unwilling individuals into a
market.

Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), and Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1
(2005), stand for the proposition that federal regulation of a particular type of
existing economic activity, such as producing a marketable commodity, can reach
that activity at a purely local level when doing so is necessary and proper to
effectively regulating that activity nationally. Neither Wickard nor Raich suggests
22
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that Congress may compel people to join a market involuntarily as an “essential”
part of a scheme to regulate that market.
a.

Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)

In Wickard, the Supreme Court upheld provisions of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act that authorized a penalty to be imposed on farmers who grew more
wheat than the quotas set for their farms as a means of limiting supply and
stabilizing market prices. 317 U.S. at 115-16. Roscoe Filburn grew more than
twice the quota for his farm; he typically sold a portion of his wheat in the
marketplace, used a portion for feeding his livestock and for home consumption,
and kept the rest for future use. Id. at 114-15. Filburn argued that the Act
exceeded Congress’s power because his activities were local and had only an
indirect effect upon interstate commerce. Id. at 119.
The Court upheld the Act, stating that “even if appellee’s activity be local
and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature,
be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate
commerce.”

Id. at 125.

The Court observed that the statute effectively

“restrict[ed] the amount [of wheat] which may be produced for market and the
extent as well to which one may forestall resort to the market by producing to meet
his own needs.” Id. at 127.
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Wickard does not suggest that Congress may regulate inactivity that has
some impact upon interstate commerce; rather, the Court held that Congress may
regulate local economic activity (growing a marketable commodity) when that
economic activity, taken in the aggregate with similar economic activity,
substantially effects interstate commerce.
The district court incorrectly relied upon Wickard for the proposition that
Congress may regulate those who decline to enter a market. JA 142. The law at
issue in Wickard penalized overproduction of wheat, a quintessential voluntary
economic activity, not the failure to make a purchase in the wheat market. Wickard
did not hold that Congress could have dealt with the issue of low wheat prices by
forcing all Americans to buy a specific amount of wheat or pay a penalty for
failing to do so, even though virtually all Americans will inevitably eat wheat at
some point, and an individual’s failure to buy a specific amount of wheat, when
viewed in the aggregate, would substantially affect overall demand for wheat and
wheat prices. To do so, Congress would have violated the Commerce Clause as it
has through the individual mandate.
The district courts that have held the individual mandate unconstitutional
have correctly noted that a key aspect of Wickard and other cases upholding
regulations under the Commerce Clause is the presence of voluntary economic
activity subjecting an individual to Congressional power. Virginia, 728 F. Supp.
24
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2d at 780 (noting that an economic activity “voluntarily placed the subject within
the stream of commerce. Absent that step, governmental regulation could have
been avoided.”); Florida, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, at *72, n.14 (noting that
“the individuals being regulated . . . were engaged in an activity . . . and each had
the choice to discontinue that activity and avoid penalty”).
Unlike the law at issue in Wickard, the individual mandate is not triggered
by any voluntary economic activity, nor can an individual avoid its application by
ceasing an ongoing economic activity. As three former U.S. Attorneys General
have explained,
the private parties in Wickard and its progeny affected the relevant
market in the same way local bootleggers affect, in the aggregate, the
liquor market. But the inactive private parties here affect the market
only in the way a teetotaler affects the liquor market. The fact that the
“substantial effects” cases authorize regulating a local bootlegger does
not remotely authorize conscripting a teetotaler to buy liquor.
Brief for Former U.S. Attorneys General William Barr, Edwin Meese, III, and
Dick Thornburgh as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs at 11-12, Virginia ex rel.
Cuccinelli v. Sebelius (4th Cir. Apr. 4, 2011) (Nos. 11-1057 & 11-1058).
b.

Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005)

Raich does not support the individual mandate either. In Raich, individuals
who wanted to use marijuana for medicinal purposes brought an as-applied
challenge (not a facial challenge as Plaintiffs bring here) to the Controlled
Substances Act (CSA), which created a “closed regulatory system” governing the
25
(Page 40 of Total)

USCA Case #11-5047

Document #1308089

Filed: 05/16/2011

Page 41 of 75

manufacture, distribution, and possession of controlled substances to “conquer
drug abuse and to control the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled
substances.” 545 U.S. at 12-13. Importantly, the Raich plaintiffs did not contend
(as Plaintiffs do here with the PPACA) “that any provision or section of the CSA
amounts to an unconstitutional exercise of congressional authority.” Id. at 15. As
such, the narrow issue before the Raich Court was “whether Congress’ power to
regulate interstate markets for medicinal substances encompasses the portions of
those markets that are supplied with drugs produced and consumed locally.” Id. at
9.
The Court held that “[t]he CSA is a valid exercise of federal power, even as
applied to the troubling facts of this case.” Id. The Court stated, “[o]ur case law
firmly establishes Congress’ power to regulate purely local activities that are part
of an economic ‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.” Id. at 17 (emphasis added) (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S.
146, 151 (1971)). Moreover, “[w]hen Congress decides that the ‘total incidence’
of a practice poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire class.”
Id. (citing Perez, 402 U.S. at 154-55). As such, “when ‘a general regulatory statute
bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual
instances arising under that statute is of no consequence.’” Id. (citation omitted).
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The Court stated that Wickard’s key holding was that “Congress can regulate
purely intrastate activity that is not itself ‘commercial,’ in that it is not produced
for sale, if it concludes that failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut
the regulation of the interstate market in that commodity.” Id. at 18. Unlike the
non-economic activities at issue in Lopez and Morrison, “the activities regulated
by the CSA are quintessentially economic. . . . The CSA . . . regulates the
production, distribution, and consumption of commodities for which there is an
established, and lucrative, interstate market.” Id. at 25-26 (emphasis added). In
addition,
Congress had a rational basis for believing that failure to regulate the
intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana would leave a
gaping hole in the CSA. Thus, as in Wickard, when it enacted
comprehensive legislation to regulate the interstate market in a
fungible commodity, Congress was acting well within its authority.
Id. at 22.

The Court described the marijuana ban as “merely one of many

‘essential part[s] of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the
regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.’”
Id. at 24-25 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561).
Significantly, unlike Raich, the instant case does not involve an as-applied
challenge to a concededly valid regulatory scheme; rather, Plaintiffs contend that
the individual mandate exceeds Congress’s authority on its face. Thus, Raich’s
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emphasis on the reluctance of courts to prohibit individual applications of a valid
statutory scheme to local economic conduct is not implicated here.
Also, the statute in Raich discouraged an ongoing “quintessentially
economic” activity:

“the production, distribution, and consumption of

commodities for which there is an established, and lucrative, interstate market.”
Id. at 25-26. The Court repeatedly emphasized Congress’s authority to target an
ongoing economic class of activities.

Id. at 17.

By contrast, the individual

mandate does not regulate an ongoing economic class of activities “within the
reach of federal power.” See id. at 23. Lawful presence in the United States,
without more, is not an economic activity akin to producing and distributing a
marketable commodity. Raich does not suggest that the targeted economic class of
activities may include the failure to buy something.
In addition, statements in Raich concerning Congress’s ability to enact a
comprehensive regulatory scheme targeting ongoing economic activity have no
bearing on the individual mandate. Raich held only that federal regulation of
economic activity—such as producing and consuming a marketable commodity—
can, in some circumstances, reach that economic activity at a local level when
doing so is necessary and proper to the effective national regulation of that
economic activity.
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Raich and other Commerce Clause cases do not suggest that Congress can—
for the first time in our Nation’s history—use its Commerce Clause power to
require individuals who are not engaging in a particular economic activity to do so
solely because other statutory provisions are connected with that mandate.
Consequently, the district court erred in concluding that Raich supports the
individual mandate. JA 144-46.
3.

Cases affirming Congress’s power to regulate an economic
class of activities, in the aggregate, do not support the
district court’s conclusion that Congress can regulate all
uninsured individuals now because some will receive health
care that they cannot pay for in the future.

The district court incorrectly held that the aggregation principle (or
economic class of activities test) allows Congress to regulate a group now because
a small subset of that group will, in the future, engage in an economic activity
within Congress’s power to regulate. JA 149-56. The district court’s holding was
based upon Defendants’ argument that because some uninsured individuals will, at
some point in the future, enter the health insurance market or receive health care
services that they cannot pay for, Congress has the authority to regulate all
uninsured individuals now and on a continuing basis for the rest of their lives.
As set forth in the Supreme Court’s cases, the aggregation principle allows
Congress to regulate individuals who are voluntarily engaged in economic activity
when their individual conduct, taken in the aggregate with the similar conduct of
29
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others, substantially affects interstate commerce. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561;
Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 277 (1981)
(stating that local activity “may be regulated by Congress, where the activity,
combined with like conduct by others similarly situated, affects commerce among
the States.”). Under this line of cases, the “class” that Congress can regulate
consists of individuals who are voluntarily engaged in the relevant economic
activity; Supreme Court jurisprudence does not suggest that Congress may reach
individuals who are not engaged in the relevant economic activity. See Raich, 545
U.S. 1 (upholding regulation of individuals who grew marijuana); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 300-02 (1964) (upholding regulation of individuals who
operated restaurants); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258
(1964) (upholding regulation of individuals who operated motels).6/
In Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), a loan shark argued that a
federal law prohibiting extortionate credit transactions could not be applied to his
local activities. The Court stated that “[w]here the class of activities is regulated
and that class is within the reach of federal power, the courts have no power ‘to

6

/ Although courts must “determine whether Congress had a rational basis
that is not overly attenuated for concluding that the class of activity substantially
affects interstate commerce,” JA 135-36, the individual mandate raises the distinct,
novel issue of whether Congress may regulate a group because of the activities of a
small subset of that group. Thus, the rational basis language from the Commerce
Clause cases provides no support for Defendants’ position on this issue.
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Id. at 154.

The Court

observed that, as a loan shark, “Petitioner is clearly a member of the class which
engages in ‘extortionate credit transactions’ as defined by Congress.” Id. at 153
(emphasis added).

In other words, the relevant “class” subject to regulation

consists of those who actually engage in the relevant economic conduct. See also
United States v. Bruce, 405 F.3d 145, 148 (3d Cir. 2005) (“The Supreme Court . . .
reasoned that, as long as Perez was a ‘member of the class which engages in
‘extortionate credit transactions’ as defined by Congress,’ then the statute was
properly applied”).
The district court greatly expanded the aggregation principle:
[e]ven assuming . . . that Plaintiffs Lee and Seven-Sky do remain
committed to refusing medical care throughout their lives, Congress
may still regulate the larger class of individuals when it “decides that
the total incidence of a practice poses a threat to a national
market.” . . . Consequently, the Court looks not to Plaintiffs’
particular situation, but must ask instead whether the practice of the
broader class of uninsured individuals threatens the national health
care market. . . . Because this Court has determined that the practices
of the broader class of uninsured individuals substantially affects the
health care market, Plaintiffs’ own individual activity may be
regulated pursuant to Congress’s Commerce Clause power.
JA 155 (emphasis added).
The district court erroneously imputed the future conduct of a small subset
of uninsured individuals to the entire group of uninsured individuals, holding that
Congress may force all uninsured individuals to maintain health insurance
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indefinitely because some uninsured individuals will engage in a certain type of
economic activity in the future. The Florida decision aptly pointed out the key
flaw in this reasoning:
The uninsured can only be said to have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce in the manner as described by the defendants: (i)
if they get sick or injured; (ii) if they are still uninsured at that specific
point in time; (iii) if they seek medical care for that sickness or injury;
(iv) if they are unable to pay for the medical care received; and (v) if
they are unable or unwilling to make payment arrangements directly
with the health care provider, or with assistance of family, friends, and
charitable groups, and the costs are thereafter shifted to others.
. . . . [A] number of the uninsured are taking the five sequential steps.
And when they do, Congress plainly has the power to regulate them at
that time (or even at the time that they initially seek medical
care) . . . . But, to cast the net wide enough to reach everyone in the
present, with the expectation that they will (or could) take those steps
in the future, goes beyond the existing “outer limits” of the Commerce
Clause.
Florida, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, at *92-95 (emphasis added).
The district court’s broad expansion of the aggregation principle finds no
support in the Supreme Court’s cases.

While Congress has broad authority

“[w]here the class of activities is regulated and that class is within the reach of
federal power,” Raich, 545 U.S. at 23 (emphasis added), the individual mandate
does not regulate a class of economic activities; its application is not tied to any
specific commercial transaction or economic conduct. Under the district court’s
analysis, Congress could have regulated all individuals present within Montgomery
County, Ohio, because some of those individuals (such as Roscoe Filburn, a party
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in Wickard) would grow too much wheat in the future, and, inevitably, they would
all eat American-grown wheat at some point in their lives. The district court’s
approach ignores the fact that, while Filburn subjected himself to Congressional
authority by growing wheat, the application of the individual mandate is not
triggered by any voluntary economic activity.
Moreover, in cases such as Heart of Atlanta Motel and Katzenbach, an
individual’s voluntary economic activity (operating a hotel, restaurant, etc.) is what
brought him within the reach of Congress’s regulatory power, and only for the
duration of that economic activity. 379 U.S. 241; 379 U.S. 294. Congress could
not have regulated all Americans who have business degrees on the theory that
Americans with business degrees, in the aggregate, operate (or may operate in the
future) many businesses that substantially affect interstate commerce.
If, for the first time in our nation’s history, the Commerce Clause is
interpreted to authorize Congress to regulate all Americans, for their entire lives,
regardless of the lack of relevant current economic or commercial activity by those
regulated, Congress would have “a plenary police power that would authorize
enactment of every type of legislation,” one “of the sort retained by the States.”
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
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There is no support for the district court’s holding that
Congress can regulate all Americans now, and indefinitely
for their entire lives, based on their “inevitable” future
participation in a market.

The inevitability of an individual’s participation in a market at some point in
his or her lifetime does not give Congress plenary authority to regulate that
individual for his or her entire lifetime. Defendants have “provided no authority
for the suggestion that once someone is in the health insurance market at a
particular point in time, they are forever in that market, always subject to
regulation, and not ever permitted to leave.” See Florida, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8822, at *96, n.22. The district court, however, held that Congress may regulate
all Americans, indefinitely, without any showing that the regulated individual is
presently engaged in a relevant economic activity, because all Americans will, at
some point in their lives, receive health care services. JA 148-51.
The implications of this unprecedented line of reasoning are stunning. There
are countless markets in which virtually all Americans will, at some point in their
lives, take part: markets for food, water, clothing, transportation, housing,
education, jobs, utilities, and recreation, to name a few. Congress has no authority
to regulate the intricacies of all Americans’ daily lives and mandate their
purchases, every day from their birth until their death, simply because they will, at
some point, participate in the market for these items and services. Congress may
regulate commercial or economic activities when they occur. Congress cannot
34
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impose onerous mandates on all Americans, owing to their mere existence, on the
premise that all Americans will engage in interstate commerce at some point.
Virginia, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 781 (noting that the government’s “broad definition of
the economic activity subject to congressional regulation lacks logical limitation
and is unsupported by Commerce Clause jurisprudence”).
The district court’s analysis is based upon the false premise that declining to
buy health insurance is “not simply a decision whether to consume a particular
good or service, but ultimately a decision as to how health care services are to be
paid and who pays for them.” JA 150. The decisions of the other two district
courts that have upheld the individual mandate under the Commerce Clause were
based on this same faulty premise. Liberty University v. Geithner, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 125922, at *49-50 (W.D. Va. 2010); TMLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
107416, at *26. The Florida court correctly rejected this “financing decision”
premise, noting that the government’s theory
is essentially true of any and all forms of insurance. It could just as
easily be said that people without burial, life, supplemental income,
credit, mortgage guaranty, business interruption, or disability
insurance have made the exact same or similar economic and
financing decisions based on their expectation that they will not incur
a particular risk at a particular point in time; or that if they do, it is
more beneficial for them to self-insure and try to meet their
obligations out-of-pocket, but always with the benefit of “backstops”
provided by law, including bankruptcy protection and other
government-funded financial assistance and services. . . . The
“economic decision” to forego virtually any and all types of insurance
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can (and cumulatively do) similarly result in significant cost-shifting
to third parties.
Florida, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, at *100-01.
The district court’s reasoning is similar to Defendants’ erroneous assertion
that the individual mandate is akin to regulating “a decision to pay by credit card
rather than by check.” Memo Sup. Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 15-1, at 26 (Aug. 20,
2010).

This analogy overlooks the speculative nature of insurance systems.

Paying the exact amount of a debt that an individual has incurred with a check or
credit card is entirely different from paying into a risk-based insurance system on a
regular and continuous basis, regardless of whether the individual incurs any debts
that insurance will partially offset. It is inaccurate to imply that medical care is
paid for in advance by purchasing insurance; insurance only pays for a percentage
of any health care services rendered (often a small one) in most instances. An
insured person is still responsible to pay deductibles, co-pays, a percentage of the
cost of any care rendered, and other costs out-of-pocket. As such, Congress has
not merely chosen the method (check, credit card, etc.) by which a consumer pays
for goods or services voluntarily purchased, but has dictated that all Americans
join a distinct, risk-based insurance market to purportedly lessen, but not eliminate,
speculative out-of-pocket costs of hypothetical health care purchases that they (or
others) may or may not make in the future.
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As in Lopez and Morrison, Defendants’ arguments, adopted
by the district court, lack a limiting principle and, if
accepted, would give rise to a federal police power.

The Supreme Court has emphasized the need to identify clear limiting
principles when assessing a purported exercise of the Commerce Clause power to
prevent converting that power into “a general police power of the sort retained by
the States.”

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68; see also id. at 578 (Kennedy, J.,

concurring) (stating that “the federal balance is too essential a part of our
constitutional structure and plays too vital a role in securing freedom for us to
admit inability to intervene when one or the other level of Government has tipped
the scales too far”). The Constitution’s creation of a system of dual sovereignty is
based upon the premise that “a healthy balance of power between the States and
the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either
front.” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991); see also Morrison, 529
U.S. at 616, n.7 (characterizing the principle of dual sovereignty as a “central
principle of our constitutional system. . . . crafted . . . so that the people’s rights
would be secured by the division of power”).
The district court’s novel theory of virtually unlimited Commerce Clause
power is at odds with the Constitution’s delegation of a few, limited powers to the
federal government. As James Madison noted in Federalist No. 45,
[t]he powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal
government, are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the
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State governments are numerous and indefinite. . . . The powers
reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in
the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and
properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and
prosperity of the State.
The Federalist No. 45, at 241 (James Madison) (George Carey & James McClellan
eds., 2001). The district court’s analysis of the Commerce Clause would bestow
upon Congress “numerous and indefinite” powers to regulate “the lives, liberties,
and properties of the people,” while leaving the States to regulate only that which
Congress declines, for the moment, to regulate. See id.
The primary limiting principle that Defendants offer is the statement that no
individual can permanently opt out of the interstate health care market. JA 148-51.
As the Florida decision noted, however,
there are lots of markets—especially if defined broadly enough—that
people cannot “opt out” of. For example, everyone must participate in
the food market. . . . [Under this logic,] Congress could require that
people buy and consume broccoli at regular intervals, not only
because the required purchases will positively impact interstate
commerce, but also because people who eat healthier tend to be
healthier, and are thus more productive and put less of a strain on the
health care system. Similarly, because virtually no one can be
divorced from the transportation market, Congress could require that
everyone above a certain income threshold buy a General Motors
automobile—now partially government-owned—because those who
do not buy GM cars (or those who buy foreign cars) are adversely
impacting commerce and a taxpayer-subsidized business.
Florida, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, at *85-87. The Virginia decision also
observed that the government’s reasoning “could apply to transportation, housing,
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or nutritional decisions.” Virginia, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 781; see also Florida, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, at *89 (asking whether Congress could “require
individuals above a certain income level to purchase a home financed with a
mortgage . . . in order to add stability to the housing and financial markets”).
Another purported limiting principle that Defendants offer is the fact that
federal law mandates that doctors and hospitals provide certain services, regardless
of the recipient’s ability to pay. JA 148-56; Emergency Medical Treatment and
Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd.7/ The district court reasoned that this case is
different from numerous hypothetical scenarios that would illustrate the breadth of
Defendants’ legal theories because, unlike in other markets, health care providers
may not decline to provide services. JA 148-50.
This attempt to establish a limiting principle is flawed for at least three
reasons.

First, the hypotheticals that best illustrate the lack of any limiting

principle include a mandate to sell or provide services analogous to the emergency
treatment mandate. For example, as Plaintiffs’ counsel noted at oral argument on
the motion to dismiss, Defendants’ theory would support a mandate that all

7

/ The existence of so-called “uncompensated” care is unsurprising because,
by definition, someone other than the recipient (taxpayers, the health care provider,
other health care consumers, insurance companies, etc.) will end up bearing the
cost for such care. Any federal law designed to address how such care is paid for,
no matter how well intentioned, must comply with the Constitution, and the
individual mandate exceeds Congress’s authority.
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Americans above a certain income level buy a General Motors vehicle so long as it
was accompanied by a mandate that General Motors dealers provide vehicles to all
who demonstrate a need for them (regardless of their ability to pay). JA 212-13.
Defendants could cite Congress’s authority to regulate the automobile market, the
fact that there would (literally) be some “free riders” without the mandate to
purchase, and the fact that, inevitably, everyone takes part in the transportation
market.8/ The wide-ranging impact of Defendants’ arguments cannot be avoided
simply by stating that “automobile manufacturers are not required by law to give
cars to people who show up at their door in need of transportation but without the
money to pay for it.” JA 149.
Second, this purported limiting principle is illusory, as it is based solely
upon the fact that, at present, Congress has elected to impose a provider mandate
regarding emergency health care but not other goods or services. The Supreme
Court rejected a similar argument in Morrison. Although the statute prohibited its
application in family law cases, the Court noted that “[u]nder our written
Constitution, however, the limitation of congressional authority is not solely a
8

/ With respect to this hypothetical, the Florida decision noted, “in the
course of defending the Constitutionality of the individual mandate, . . . often-cited
law professor and dean of the University of California Irvine School of Law Erwin
Chemerinsky has opined that . . . ‘Congress could use its commerce power to
require people to buy cars.’ . . . When I mentioned this to the defendants’ attorney
at oral argument, he allowed for the possibility that ‘maybe Dean Chemerinsky is
right.’” Florida, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, at *87-88.
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matter of legislative grace.” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616; see also id. at 616, n.7
(noting that courts have the authority to decide whether Congress has exceeded the
outer bounds of its power, while “political accountability is and has been the only
limit on Congress’ exercise of the commerce power within that power’s outer
bounds”). Congress cannot support an unconstitutional assertion of power by
simply making a non-binding promise not to go even further in the future. Cf.
United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1591 (2010) (“We would not uphold an
unconstitutional statute merely because the Government promised to use it
responsibly.”).
Third, the district court reasoned that “[w]hen a supplier is obligated by law
to produce goods or services for free, there is bound to be a substantial effect on
market prices if consumers’ behavior results in that obligation’s frequent
invocation.” JA 149. Rather than serving as a limiting principle, this illustrates the
lack of a limiting principle by suggesting that Congress has broad power to impose
mandates upon providers and then “correct” the Congressionally-exacerbated
market imbalance by imposing mandates to buy upon unwilling individuals.
The findings Congress set forth in Section 1501 to support the individual
mandate illustrate the limitless bounds of Congress’s power under Defendants’
theory. Congress stated that “[t]he economy loses up to $207,000,000,000 a year
because of the poorer health and shorter lifespan of the uninsured,” and declared
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that the individual mandate would “significantly reduce this economic cost.” §
1501(a)(2)(E), as amended by § 10106(a); JA 65. If the economic impact of
Americans’ poor health provided a sufficient basis for Congress to mandate that
individuals buy health insurance, Congress could also mandate that individuals
take other actions considered necessary to improve health and lengthen life
expectancies—such as requiring Americans to buy a gym membership, keep a
specific body weight, or maintain a healthier diet—or pay penalties for failing to
do so. See Florida, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, at *103, n.25 (“under the
defendants’ rationale . . . Congress may also regulate the ‘economic decisions’ not
to go to the doctor for regular check-ups and screenings.”); Brief for Members of
the United States Senate as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs at 11, Florida v.
U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822 (N.D. Fla. 2011)
(No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT) (“this same rationale would allow Congress to punish
individuals for not purchasing health-related products, like vitamin supplements,
on the ground that their failure to do so would increase health care costs by not
ameliorating or preventing health conditions, like osteoporosis.”).
Congress also alleged that the individual mandate would lower the cost of
health insurance premiums for those who buy insurance by reducing cost-shifting.
§ 1501(a)(2)(F), as amended by § 10106(a); JA 65. The government made a
similar cost-shifting argument in Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-64, but the Supreme Court
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held that Congress can only reach “economic activity” that substantially affects
interstate commerce; neither gun possession nor lawful presence in the United
States is economic activity.
In a similar vein, Congress declared that requiring individuals to buy health
insurance will benefit those who participate in the health insurance market in
various ways, such as by “creating effective health insurance markets in which
improved health insurance products . . . can be sold,” “reduc[ing] administrative
costs[,] and lower[ing] health insurance premiums.”

§ 1501(a)(2)(I), (J), as

amended by § 10106(a); JA 65-66. Similar arguments, however, could be made
for virtually any market, as forcing unwilling participants into a market would
likely benefit voluntary market participants in a variety of ways.
In sum, Section 1501’s unprecedented mandate to buy a product from a
private company is inconsistent with our constitutional tradition:
What separates the United States from other countries is the minimal
and fundamental nature of the duties its citizens owe the state. During
World War II, the people were not commandeered to work in defense
plants or buy war bonds. Even voting is not mandated in the United
States.
Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health
Insurance Mandate Is Unconstitutional, 5 NYU J.L. & Liberty 581, 631 (2010).
Although the PPACA is the first federal law relying on the Commerce Clause to
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cross the line between encouraging increased market activity and mandating
individual purchases, it will certainly not be the last if Section 1501 is upheld.
B.

The individual mandate is not authorized by the Necessary and
Proper Clause.

Article I, Section 8 grants Congress the power “[t]o make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” The individual mandate exceeds
Congress’s authority under this Clause, a provision that the Supreme Court has
characterized as “the last, best hope of those who defend ultra vires congressional
action.” Printz, 521 U.S. at 923.
Although Defendants have focused their attention on the alleged necessity of
the individual mandate to avoid negative consequences that other portions of the
PPACA would create, necessity is only half of the equation; a federal law must
also be proper (i.e., consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution and our
system of dual sovereignty) to be within the scope of the Necessary and Proper
Clause. See, e.g., id. at 923-24 (noting that a law is not “proper” if it “violates the
principle of state sovereignty”).
Given the wide-ranging implications of the arguments offered in support of
the individual mandate, the fact that the Commerce Clause does not authorize
Section 1501 (as discussed previously) illustrates that it also exceeds the scope of
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the Necessary and Proper Clause. Virginia, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 782 (the Clause
“may only be constitutionally deployed when tethered to a lawful exercise of an
enumerated power. . . . [Section 1501] is neither within the letter nor the spirit of
the Constitution.”); Florida, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, at *114, *116 (“the
individual mandate is neither within the letter nor the spirit of the Constitution. To
uphold that provision via application of the Necessary and Proper Clause
would . . . effectively remove all limits on federal power. . . . By definition, it
cannot be ‘proper.’”).
In a recent case, United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010), the
Supreme Court upheld a federal civil commitment statute that authorized the
continued detention of mentally ill, sexually dangerous federal prisoners beyond
their normal release date. The Court based its conclusion “on five considerations,
taken together”:
(1) the breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause, (2) the long
history of federal involvement in this arena, (3) the sound reasons for
the statute’s enactment in light of the Government’s custodial interest
in safeguarding the public from dangers posed by those in federal
custody, (4) the statute’s accommodation of state interests, and (5) the
statute’s narrow scope.
Id. at 1956, 1965.
Regarding the first factor, the Court stated that “the Necessary and Proper
Clause grants Congress broad authority to enact federal legislation.” Id. at 1956.
The Court quoted McCulloch, which stated, “‘[l]et the end be legitimate, let it be
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within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which
are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter
and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.’” Id. (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S.
at 421). A statute based upon the Necessary and Proper Clause must be “a means
that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated
power.” Id.
With regard to the second and third factors, the Court characterized the
statute as “a modest addition to a set of federal prison-related mental-health
statutes that have existed for many decades.” Id. at 1958. The statute was a
relatively minor supplement to another statute “which, since 1949, has authorized
the post-sentence detention of federal prisoners who suffer from a mental illness
and who are thereby dangerous (whether sexually or otherwise).” Id. at 1961. The
statute satisfied “‘review for means-end rationality’” because it “represent[ed] a
rational means for implementing a constitutional grant of legislative authority.” Id.
at 1962. The Court held that the statute was “reasonably adapted” to “Congress’
power to act as a responsible federal custodian.” Id. at 1961.
The Court also held that the statute met the fourth factor of “properly
account[ing] for state interests.”

Id. at 1962.

The statute “require[d]

accommodation of state interests” by providing the State in which the prisoner
lived or was tried with a right to assume responsibility for the prisoner, which
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would end federal government involvement. Id. at 1962-63; see also id. at 196768 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“It is of fundamental importance to consider whether
essential attributes [of federalism] are compromised by the assertion of federal
power under the Necessary and Proper Clause; if so, that is a factor suggesting that
the power is not one properly within the reach of federal power.”).
Finally, the Court held that “the links between [the statute] and an
enumerated Article I power are not too attenuated.

Neither is the statutory

provision too sweeping in its scope.” Id. at 1963. The link between the power to
imprison offenders and the power to ensure that they do not endanger the safety of
other prisoners or the public is a close one. Id. at 1964. Importantly, the Court’s
holding would not “confer[] on Congress a general ‘police power, which the
Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the States’” because the
statute was “narrow in scope.” Id. (quoting Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618). The
statute had “been applied to only a small fraction of federal prisoners,” and its
reach was “limited to individuals already in the custody of the Federal
Government.” Id. (citations omitted). As such, the Court concluded that the
statute was “a reasonably adapted and narrowly tailored means of pursuing the
Government’s legitimate interest as a federal custodian in the responsible
administration of its prison system.” Id. at 1965.
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Section 1501 fails the Comstock factors and, therefore, exceeds Congress’s
authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Unlike the statute at issue in
Comstock, the individual mandate is not “a modest addition” to previous federal
law but rather is “sweeping in its scope.” See id. at 1958, 1963. There is no
history at all of congressional mandates based upon the Commerce Clause
requiring individuals to purchase a good or service. See also Lopez, 514 U.S. at
563 (finding it significant that the Act “plows thoroughly new ground and
represents a sharp break with the long-standing pattern of federal firearms
legislation.”). It takes an immense (and unconstitutional) leap to go from imposing
regulations upon the health insurance industry to mandating individual
participation in the health insurance market. Florida, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8822, at *106-07 (“A statute mandating that everyone purchase a product from a
private company or be penalized (merely by virtue of being alive and a lawful
citizen) is not a ‘modest’ addition to federal involvement in the national health care
market, nor is it ‘narrow [in] scope.’”).
Moreover, the individual mandate tramples upon State interests. Before
Section 1501, States were free to determine whether to adopt a mandatory
insurance system similar to Massachusetts’s or maintain a voluntary free market
system. See § 1501(a)(2)(D), as amended by § 10106(a); JA 65. That is no longer
the case. If the individual mandate is upheld, many similar federal laws requiring
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individuals to buy goods or services would be possible (perhaps likely), further
eroding State and local government authority in favor of a broad federal police
power.
In addition, the Constitution does not give Congress carte blanche to enact
any provision of its choosing so long as it bears some connection to a larger
regulatory scheme.

See generally Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1970 (Alito, J.,

concurring) (“The Necessary and Proper Clause does not give Congress carte
blanche”). Section 1501’s findings section declares:
[T]he Federal Government has a significant role in regulating health
insurance. [Section 1501] is an essential part of this larger regulation
of economic activity, and the absence of the requirement would
undercut Federal regulation of the health insurance market.
§ 1501(a)(2)(H), as amended by § 10106(a); JA 65. Congress made a similar
argument with respect to the individual mandate’s connection to PPACA
provisions prohibiting insurance companies from denying coverage based upon
preexisting medical conditions. § 1501(a)(2)(I), as amended by § 10106(a); JA 65.
The implications of this line of reasoning are far-reaching for the reasons stated
above with respect to the Commerce Clause.

Such a broad, unprecedented

assertion of power clearly fails the test for “means-end rationality,” see Comstock,
130 S. Ct. at 1961-62, and is by no means “appropriate” or “consist[ent] with the
letter and spirit of the constitution,” McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421. In a word, it is
not proper.
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In addition, Defendants have
essentially admit[ed] that the Act will have serious negative
consequences . . . unless the individual mandate is imposed. Thus,
rather than being used to implement or facilitate enforcement of the
Act’s insurance industry reforms, the individual mandate is actually
being used as the means to avoid the adverse consequences of the Act
itself. Such an application of the Necessary and Proper Clause would
have the perverse effect of enabling Congress to pass ill-conceived, or
economically disruptive statutes, secure in the knowledge that the
more dysfunctional the results of the statute are, the more essential or
“necessary” the statutory fix would be. . . . This result would, of
course, expand the Necessary and Proper Clause far beyond its
original meaning, and allow Congress to exceed the powers
specifically enumerated in Article I.
Florida, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, at *110-11 (emphasis added).
Because Congress lacked the Article I authority to enact the PPACA’s
individual mandate, that mandate is unconstitutional.9/
II.

THE THREATENED ENFORCEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL
MANDATE AGAINST PLAINTIFFS SEVEN-SKY AND LEE
VIOLATES THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
RESTORATION ACT.
Section 1501 substantially burdens Plaintiffs Seven-Sky and Lee’s religious

exercise by requiring them to either take actions contrary to their religious faith or

9

/ Because the district court held that the individual mandate was valid, the
court did not address the issue of severability that Plaintiffs raised in the Amended
Complaint. JA 38. For the reasons set forth in the Florida decision, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8822, at *116-36, and Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. 12, at
58-60 (Aug. 10, 2010), Section 1501 is not severable and the PPACA is
unconstitutional in its entirety.
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pay annual penalties. Because applying the individual mandate to these Plaintiffs
is not the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest,
doing so violates their rights as set forth in RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. The
district court erred in concluding that “§ 1501 does not place a substantial burden
on the exercise of Plaintiffs’ Christian faith, and . . . is the least restrictive means of
serving a compelling governmental interest.” JA 166.
Review of the district court’s dismissal of the RFRA claims is de novo,
Kaemmerling, 553 F.3d at 676, and on a motion to dismiss, “a court must accept as
true all of the [factual] allegations contained in a complaint,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
RFRA states that the federal government “shall not substantially burden a
person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a), unless the government “demonstrates that
application of the burden to the person . . . 1) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and 2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b). RFRA “restore[s]
the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)
and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b).
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Substantial Burden

The religious exercise protected by RFRA “includes any exercise of religion,
whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb-2 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A)). “A substantial burden exists
when government action puts ‘substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his
behavior and to violate his beliefs.’” Kaemmerling, 553 F.3d at 678 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981)).
The individual mandate substantially burdens Seven-Sky and Lee’s religious
exercise for the reasons set forth in their Amended Complaint (as well as in their
Statement of Material Facts and accompanying declarations). JA 19-24, 37-38, 4852, 79-86. In sum, these Plaintiffs strongly object to being required to either
maintain health insurance or pay annual penalties because they believe that God
will provide for their health and financial needs.

JA 49-52.

Their religious

exercise is substantially burdened because they will be forced to pay penalties for
refusing to act contrary to their religious principles.
The district court concluded that Plaintiffs’ religious exercise is not
substantially burdened because Section 1501 “permits them to pay a shared
responsibility payment in lieu of actually obtaining health insurance.” JA 164.
This holding squarely conflicts with Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the
case on which RFRA is modeled.
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In Sherbert, the State of South Carolina denied a Seventh-Day Adventist’s
application for unemployment benefits because she was fired for refusing to work
on Saturday, even though Saturday was the Sabbath Day of her faith, and she was
unable to obtain another job due to her religious objection. Id. at 399-401. Similar
to the district court’s ruling here, the South Carolina Supreme Court concluded that
the law did not substantially burden her religious exercise because she was not
forced to work on her Sabbath. Id. at 401.
The United States Supreme Court reversed, stating,
We turn first to the question whether the disqualification for benefits
imposes any burden on the free exercise of appellant’s religion. We
think it is clear that it does. . . . [N]ot only is it apparent that
appellant’s declared ineligibility for benefits derives solely from the
practice of her religion, but the pressure upon her to forego that
practice is unmistakable. The ruling forces her to choose between
following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the
one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order
to accept work, on the other hand. Governmental imposition of such a
choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion
as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship.
Id. at 403-04 (emphasis added).
Similarly, the individual mandate “forces [Seven-Sky and Lee] to choose
between following the precepts of [their] religion and [paying annual penalties], on
the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of [their] religion . . . on the
other hand.” See id. It is especially telling that the Sherbert Court compared the
loss of unemployment benefits to “a fine imposed against appellant for her
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Saturday worship” because the individual mandate authorizes annual penalties
against Seven-Sky and Lee for failing to indefinitely maintain health insurance.
The district court also stated (contrary to the factual allegations in the
Amended Complaint, JA 19-24, 37-38, which a court must accept as true on a
motion to dismiss, and without providing leave to amend) that “Plaintiffs have
failed to allege any facts demonstrating that this conflict is more than a de minimus
[sic] burden on their Christian faith.” JA 163-64. In effect, the court imposed a
heightened pleading standard based upon this Court’s statement that “a burden on
activity unimportant to the adherent’s religious scheme” cannot be a substantial
burden, Kaemmerling, 553 F.3d at 678, which is simply another way of stating that
the burden imposed must be substantial.10/

The district court’s heightened

pleading standard conflicts with RFRA’s protection of “any exercise of religion,
whether or not . . . central to, a system of religious belief” and ignores the
sufficient allegations in the Amended Complaint. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2; see also
JA 19-24, 37-38; Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50 (noting that Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 “does
not require ‘detailed factual allegations’” and “marks a notable and generous

10

/ In Kaemmerling, the plaintiff merely objected to the government’s own
conduct (extracting DNA from his blood, hair, etc.); he did not object to the
removal of hair from his body. As such, he was not put to a choice between some
penalty and taking action that would violate his faith, as Plaintiffs here have
alleged in their Amended Complaint concerning the individual mandate. JA 19-24,
37-38.
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departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era”). As
noted previously, one’s religious exercise is substantially burdened when the
government puts him to the choice of either incurring a penalty or violating his
faith, and the Amended Complaint clearly illustrates how that is the case for
Seven-Sky and Lee. JA 19-24, 37-38.
B.

Strict Scrutiny

Defendants failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that applying
Section 1501 to Seven-Sky and Lee is the least restrictive means of achieving a
compelling government interest, and the district court erred in concluding
otherwise. JA 163-66. “RFRA demands that ‘the compelling interest test [be]
satisfied through application of the challenged law ‘to the person’—the particular
claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened.’”
Kaemmerling, 553 F.3d at 682 (emphasis added). “A statute or regulation is the
least restrictive means if ‘no alternative forms of regulation would [accomplish the
compelling interest] without infringing [religious exercise] rights.’” Id. at 684
(quoting Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407).
Defendants cannot prove the existence of any compelling governmental
interest that can be furthered only by requiring Seven-Sky and Lee to buy health
insurance. The justifications offered for the individual mandate, such as a desire to
lower insurance premiums for those who are voluntarily insured, are not
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“compelling” government interests, and forcing Plaintiffs to buy health insurance
is not the least restrictive way to further such interests.
In addition, although protecting public health is a compelling interest
justifying some forms of regulation, the attenuated chain of reasoning it takes to go
from the mere fact of being lawfully present in the United States without health
insurance to a threat to public health is similar to Defendants’ attenuated reasoning
concerning the impact on interstate commerce.

See Florida, 2011 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 8822, at *92-95. The reality is that the individual mandate was designed to
force Plaintiffs into the health insurance market to benefit voluntary market
participants and alleviate the PPACA’s negative consequences; Defendants’ claim
that the individual mandate is necessary to protect public health during this
litigation is merely self-serving.
Moreover, Plaintiffs do not object to the government spending public funds
to provide other individuals with insurance; their objection to being required to
maintain health insurance themselves is fundamentally different—it is specifically
based on their religious faith and the government coercion to violate that faith or
pay financial penalties for adhering to that faith.

JA 19-24, 37-38.

The

government’s interest in ensuring that Americans who cannot provide for
themselves receive public support of some kind is much stronger than its interest in
forcing Plaintiffs to maintain health insurance. See generally United States v. Lee,
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455 U.S. 252, 258-60 (1982) (rejecting a challenge to the payment of Social
Security taxes because it was indistinguishable from the payment of general
income taxes, and the income tax system could not function if all individuals who
object to any use of public funds were exempted or if contributions were
voluntary).
Concerning Defendants’ attempt to demonstrate that the individual mandate
is the least restrictive means available, the district court cited to Section 1501’s
exceedingly narrow exemptions. JA 165. Seven-Sky and Lee have no reason to
anticipate joining an Amish community or seeking and finding a health care
sharing ministry eligible for an exemption whose religious tenets match their own.
More importantly, Plaintiffs object to being forced to join a health insurance
system against their will, regardless of whether that system is run by a private
company or a religious organization to which Plaintiffs do not belong. Section
1501’s narrow religious exemptions are not a one-size-fits-all means of relieving
any and all substantial burdens imposed by the individual mandate.11/

11

/ At oral argument, Plaintiffs’ counsel cited the possibility of imposing a
tax at the point of sale for those who receive health care without having health
insurance as a less restrictive means of dealing with the issue of uncompensated
care. JA 215, 236. Therefore, the District Court’s statement that Plaintiffs could
not name a less restrictive alternative at oral argument is incorrect. JA 165.
57
(Page 72 of Total)

USCA Case #11-5047

Document #1308089

Filed: 05/16/2011

Page 73 of 75

CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the district court’s final decision and, in particular,
hold that Section 1501 is unconstitutional and that the district court erred in
dismissing Plaintiffs’ RFRA claims. This case should be remanded for further
consideration.
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124 STAT. 242 PUBLIC LAW 111-148--MAR. 23, 2010
"(36) the small employer health insurance credit determined under section 45R.".
26 USC 38 .

(c) CREDIT ALLOWED AGAINST ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX.Section 38 ( c)(4)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (defining
specified credits ) is amended by redesignating clauses ( vi), (vii),

and (viii ) as clauses ( vii), (viii ), and (ix), respectively, and by
inserting after clause (v) the following new clause:
"(vi) the credit determined under section 45R,".
(d) DISALLOWANCE OF DEDUCTION FOR CERTAIN EXPENSES FOR
WHICH CREDIT ALLOWED.-

(1) IN GENERAL.-Section 280C of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 ( relating to disallowance of deduction for certain
expenses for which credit allowed ), as amended by section
1401(b), is amended by adding at the end the following new
subsection:
"(h) CREDIT FOR EMPLOYEE HEALTH INSURANCE EXPENSES OF
SMALL EMPLOYERS .-No deduction shall be allowed for that portion
of the premiums for qualified health plans ( as defined in section
1301(a) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act), or
for health insurance coverage in the case of taxable years beginning
in 2011, 2012 , or 2013, paid by an employer which is equal to
the amount of the credit determined under section 45R ( a) with
respect to the premiums.".
(2) DEDUCTION FOR EXPIRING CREDITS.-Section 196(c) of
such Code is amended by striking "and" at the end of paragraph
(12), by striking the period at the end of paragraph (13) and
inserting ", and", and by adding at the end the following new
paragraph:

"(14) the small employer health insurance credit determined under section 45R(a).".
(e) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.-The table of sections for subpart
D of part IV of subchapter A of chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the following:
"Sec. 45R . Employee health insurance expenses of small employers.".
Applicability .

( U EFFECTIVE DATES.-

26 USC 38 note. (1 ) IN GENERAL.-The amendments made by this section
shall apply to amounts paid or incurred in taxable years beginning after December 31, 2010.
(2) MINIMUM TAX.-The amendments made by subsection
(c) shall apply to credits determined under section 45R of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 in taxable years beginning
after December 31, 2010, and to carrybacks of such credits.

Subtitle F-Shared Responsibility for
Health Care
PART I--INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY
42 USC 18091.

SEC. 1501. REQUIREMENT TO MAINTAIN MINIMUM ESSENTIAL COVERAGE.

(a) FINDINGS.-Congress makes the following findings:
(1) IN GENERAL .- The individual responsibility requirement
provided for in this section ( in this subsection referred to as
the "requirement ") is commercial and economic in nature, and
substantially affects interstate commerce, as a result of the
effects described in paragraph (2).

p. 2
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PUBLIC LAW 111-148-MAR. 23, 2010 124 STAT. 243
(2) EFFECTS ON THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND INTERSTATE
COMMERCE.--The effects described in this paragraph are the
following:

(A) The requirement regulates activity that is commercial and economic in nature: economic and financial
decisions about how and when health care is paid for,
and when health insurance is purchased.
(B) Health insurance and health care services are a
significant part of the national economy. National health
spending is projected to increase from $2,500,000,000,000,
or 17.6 percent of the economy, in 2009 to
$4,700,000,000,000 in 2019. Private health insurance
spending is projected to be $854,000,000,000 in 2009, and
pays for medical supplies, drugs, and equipment that are
shipped in interstate commerce. Since most health insurance is sold by national or regional health insurance companies, health insurance is sold in interstate commerce and
claims payments flow through interstate commerce.
(C) The requirement, together with the other provisions
of this Act, will add millions of new consumers to the
health insurance market, increasing the supply of, and
demand for, health care services. According to the Congressional Budget Office, the requirement will increase the
number and share of Americans who are insured.
(D) The requirement achieves near-universal coverage
by building upon and strengthening the private • employerbased health insurance system, which covers 176,000,000
Americans nationwide. In Massachusetts, a similar requirement has strengthened private employer-based coverage:
despite the economic downturn, the number of workers
offered employer-based coverage has actually increased.
(E) Half of all personal bankruptcies are caused in
part by medical expenses. By significantly increasing health
insurance coverage, the requirement, together with the
other provisions of this Act, will improve financial security
for families.

(F) Under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.), the Public Health
Service Act (42 U.S.C. 201 et seq.), and this Act, the Federal
Government has a significant role in regulating health
insurance which is in interstate commerce.
(G) Under sections 2704 and 2705 of the Public Health
Service Act (as added by section 1201 of this Act), if there
were no requirement, many individuals would wait to purchase health insurance until they needed care. By significantly increasing health insurance coverage, the requirement, together with the other provisions of this Act, will
minimize this adverse selection and broaden the health
insurance risk pool to include healthy individuals, which
will lower health insurance premiums. The requirement
is essential to creating effective health insurance markets
in which improved health insurance products that are
guaranteed issue and do not exclude coverage of preexisting conditions can be sold.
(H) Administrative costs for private health insurance,
which were $90,000,000,000 in 2006, are 26 to 30 percent
of premiums in the current individual and small group
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124 STAT. 244 PUBLIC LAW 111-148--MAR. 23, 2010
markets. By significantly increasing health insurance coverage and the size of purchasing pools, which will increase
economies of scale, the requirement, together with the other
provisions of this Act, will significantly reduce administrative costs and lower health insurance premiums. The
requirement is essential to creating effective health insurance markets that do not require underwriting and eliminate its associated administrative costs.
(3) SUPREME COURT RULING.--In United States v. SouthEastern Underwriters Association (322 U.S. 533 (1944)), the
Supreme Court of the United States ruled that insurance is
interstate commerce subject to Federal regulation.

(b) IN GENERAL.-Subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the following new chapter:
"CHAPTER 48-MAINTENANCE OF MINIMUM ESSENTIAL
COVERAGE
"Sec. 5000A. Requirement to maintain minimum essential coverage.
26 USC 5000A. "SEC. 5000A. REQUIREMENT TO MAINTAIN MINIMUM ESSENTIAL COVERAGE.

"(a) REQUIREMENT TO MAINTAIN MINIMUM ESSENTIAL COVERAGE.-An applicable individual shall for each month beginning
after 2013 ensure that the individual, and any dependent of the
individual who is an applicable individual, is covered under minimum essential coverage for such month.
"(b) SHARED RESPONSIBILITY PAYMENT.---

Penalty. "(1) IN GENERAL.-If an applicable individual fails to meet
the requirement of subsection (a) for 1 or more months during
any calendar year beginning after 2013, then, except as provided in subsection (d), there is hereby imposed a penalty
with respect to the individual in the amount determined under
subsection (c).
"(2) INCLUSION WITH RETURN.-Any penalty imposed by
this section with respect to any month shall be included with
a taxpayer's return under chapter 1 for the taxable year which
includes such month.
"(3) PAYMENT OF PENALTY.-If an individual with respect
to whom a penalty is imposed by this section for any month"(A) is a dependent (as defined in section 152) of

another taxpayer for the other taxpayer's taxable year
including such month, such other taxpayer shall be liable
for such penalty, or
"(B) files a joint return for the taxable year including
such month, such individual and the spouse of such individual shall be jointly liable for such penalty.
"(c) AMOUNT OF PENALTY.-

"(1) IN GENERAL.-The penalty determined under this subsection for any month with respect to any individual is an
amount equal to 442 of the applicable dollar amount for the
calendar year.
"(2) DOLLAR LIMITATION.-The amount of the penalty
imposed by this section on any taxpayer for any taxable year
with respect to all individuals for whom the taxpayer is liable
under subsection (b)(3) shall not exceed an amount equal to
300 percent the applicable dollar amount (determined without
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PUBLIC LAW 111-148--MAR. 23, 2010 124 STAT. 245
regard to paragraph (3)(C)) for the calendar year with or within
which the taxable year ends.
"(3) APPLICABLE DOLLAR AMOUNT.-For purposes of paragraph (1)"(A) IN GENERAL.-Except as provided in subparagraphs (B) and (C), the applicable dollar amount is 750.
"(B) PHASE IN.-The applicable dollar amount is $95
for 2014 and $350 for 2015.
"(C) SPECIAL RULE FOR INDIVIDUALS UNDER AGE 18.If an applicable individual has not attained the age of
18 as of the beginning of a month, the applicable dollar
amount with respect to such individual for the month shall
be equal to one-half of the applicable dollar amount for
the calendar year in which the month occurs.
"(D) INDEXING OF AMOUNT.-In the case of any calendar
year beginning after 2016, the applicable dollar amount
shall be equal to $750, increased by an amount equal
to-

"(i) $750, multiplied by
"(ii) the cost-of-living adjustment determined
under section 1(0(3) for the calendar year, determined
by substituting `calendar year 2015' for `calendar year
1992' in subparagraph (B) thereof.
If the amount of any increase under clause (i) is not a
multiple of $50, such increase shall be rounded to the
next lowest multiple of $50.
"(4) TERMS RELATING TO INCOME AND FAMILIES.-For purposes of this section"(A) FAMILY SIZE.-The family size involved with
respect to any taxpayer shall be equal to the number of
individuals for whom the taxpayer is allowed a deduction
under section 151 (relating to allowance of deduction for
personal exemptions) for the taxable year.
"(B) HOUSEHOLD INCOME.-The term `household
income' means, with respect to any taxpayer for any taxable
year, an amount equal to the sum of"(i) the modified gross income of the taxpayer,
plus

"(ii) the aggregate modified gross incomes of all
other individuals who"(I) were taken into account in determining
the taxpayer's family size under paragraph (1),
and

"(II) were required to file a return of tax
imposed by section 1 for the taxable year.
"(C) MODIFIED GROSS INCOME.-The term `modified
gross income' means gross income-

"(i) decreased by the amount of any deduction
allowable under paragraph (1), (3), (4), or (10) of section
62(a),
"(ii) increased by the amount of interest received
or accrued during the taxable year which is exempt
from tax imposed by this chapter, and
"(iii) determined without regard to sections 911,
931, and 933.
"(D) POVERTY LINE.-
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"(i) IN GENERAL.-The term `poverty line' has the
meaning given that term in section 2110(c)(5) of the
Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1397jj(c)(5)).
"(ii) POVERTY LINE USED.--In the case ' of any taxable year ending with or within a calendar year, the
poverty line used shall be the most recently published
poverty line as of the 1st day of such calendar year.
"(d) APPLICABLE INDIVIDUAL.--For purposes of this section"(1) IN GENERAL.-The term `applicable individual' means,
with respect to any month, an individual other than an individual described in paragraph (2), (3), or (4).
"(2) RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS.-

"(A) RELIGIOUS CONSCIENCE EXEMPTION,-Such term
shall not include any individual for any month if such
individual has in effect an exemption under section
1311(d)(4)(H) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act which certifies that such individual is a member of
a recognized religious sect or division thereof described
in section 1402(g)(1) and an adherent of established tenets
or teachings of such sect or division as described in such
section.
"(B) HEALTH CARE SHARING MINISTRY.-

"(i) IN GENERAL.-Such term shall not include any
individual for any month if such individual is a member
of a health care sharing ministry for the month.
"(ii) HEALTH CARE SHARING MINISTRY.--The term
`health care sharing ministry' means an organization"(I) which is described in section 501(c)(3) and
is exempt from taxation under section 501(a),

"(II) members of which share a common set
of ethical or religious beliefs and share medical
expenses among members in accordance with those
beliefs and without regard to the State in which
a member resides or is employed,
"(III) members of which retain membership
even after they develop a medical condition,
"(IV) which (or a predecessor of which) has
been in existence at all times since December 31,
1999, and medical expenses of its members have
been shared continuously and without interruption
since at least December 31, 1999, and
"(V) which conducts an annual audit which
is performed by an independent certified public
accounting firm in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles and which is made
available to the public upon request.
"(3) INDIVIDUALS NOT LAWFULLY PRESENT.-Such term shall
not include an individual for any month if for the month the
individual is not a citizen or national of the United States
or an alien lawfully present in the United States.
"(4) INCARCERATED INDIVIDUALS.--Such term shall not
include an individual for any month if for the month the individual is incarcerated, other than incarceration pending the
disposition of charges.

(e) EXEMPTIONS.-No penalty shall be imposed under subsection (a) with respect to"(1) INDIVIDUALS WHO CANNOT AFFORD COVERAGE.--
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"(A) IN GENERAL.--Any applicable individual for any
month if the applicable individual's required contribution
(determined on an annual basis) for coverage for the month
exceeds 8 percent of such individual's household income
for the taxable year described in section 1412(b)(1)(B) of
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. For purposes of applying this subparagraph, the taxpayer's household income shall be increased by any exclusion from gross
income for any portion of the required contribution made
through a salary reduction arrangement.
"(B) REQUIRED CONTRIBUTION.--For purposes of this Definition.
paragraph, the term `required contribution' means-

"(1) in the case of an individual eligible to purchase
minimum essential coverage consisting of coverage
through an eligible-employer-sponsored plan, the portion of the annual premium which would be paid by
the individual (without regard to whether paid through
salary reduction or otherwise) for self only coverage,
or

"(ii) in the case of an individual eligible only to
purchase minimum essential coverage described in subsection (f)(1)(C), the annual premium for the lowest
cost bronze plan available in the individual market
through the Exchange in the State in the rating area
in which the individual resides (without regard to
whether the individual purchased a qualified health
plan through the Exchange), reduced by the amount
of the credit allowable under section 36B for the taxable year (determined as if the individual was covered
by a qualified health plan offered through the
Exchange for the entire taxable year).
"(C) SPECIAL RULES FOR INDIVIDUALS RELATED TO
EMPLOYEES.--For purposes of subparagraph (B)(i), if an
applicable individual is eligible for minimum essential coverage through an employer by reason of a relationship
to an employee, the determination shall be made by reference to the affordability of the coverage to the employee.
"(D) INDEXING.--In the case of plan years beginning Applicability.
in any calendar year after 2014, subparagraph (A) shall Determination.
be applied by substituting for `8 percent' the percentage

the Secretary of Health and Human Services determines
reflects the excess of the rate of premium growth between
the preceding calendar year and 2013 over the rate of
income growth for such period.
"(2) TAXPAYERS WITH INCOME UNDER 100 PERCENT OF POVERTY LINE.--Any applicable individual for any month during
a calendar year if the individual's household income for the
taxable year described in section 1412(b)(1)(B) of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act is less than 100 percent
of the poverty line for the size of the family involved (determined in the same manner as under subsection (b)(4)).
"(3) MEMBERS OF INDIAN TRIBES.--Any applicable individual
for any month during which the individual is a member of
an Indian tribe (as defined in section 45A(c)(6)).
"(4) MONTHS DURING SHORT COVERAGE GAPS.--

"(A) IN GENERAL. Any month the last day of which
occurred during a period in which the applicable individual
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was not covered by minimum essential coverage for a
continuous period of less than 3 months.
Applicability.

"(B) SPECIAL RULES.-For purposes of applying this
paragraph--

"(i) the length of a continuous period shall be determined without regard to the calendar years in which
months in such period occur,
"(ii) if a continuous period is greater than the
period allowed under subparagraph (A), no exception
shall be provided under this paragraph for any month
in the period, and
"(iii) if there is more than 1 continuous period
described in subparagraph (A) covering months in a
calendar year, the exception provided by this paragraph shall only apply to months in the first of such
periods.
The Secretary shall prescribe rules for the collection of
the penalty imposed by this section in cases where continuous periods include months in more than 1 taxable year.
"(5) HARDSHIPS. Any applicable individual who for any

month is determined by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services under section 1311(d)(4)(H) to have suffered a hardship
with respect to the capability to obtain coverage under a qualified health plan.
Definition,

"U) MINIMUM ESSENTIAL COVERAGE,-For purposes of this section"(1) IN GENERAL.-The term `minimum essential coverage'
means any of the following:
"(A) GOVERNMENT SPONSORED PROGRAMS.-Coverage
under--

"(i) the Medicare program under part A of title
XVIII of the Social Security Act,
"(ii) the Medicaid program under title XIX of the
Social Security Act,
"(iii) the CHIP program under title XXI of the
Social Security Act,
"(iv) the TRICARE for Life program,
"(v) the veteran's health care program under
chapter 17 of title 38, United States Code, or
"(vi) a health plan under section 2504(e) of title
22, United States Code (relating to Peace Corps volunteers).
"(B) EMPLOYER-SPONSORED PLAN.-Coverage under an
eligible employer-sponsored plan.
"(C) PLANS IN THE INDIVIDUAL MARKET.--Coverage
under a health plan offered in the individual market within
a State.
"(D) GRANDFATHERED HEALTH PLAN.-Coverage under
a grandfathered health plan.
"(E) OTHER COVERAGE.-Such other health benefits coverage, such as a State health benefits risk pool, as the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, in coordination
with the Secretary, recognizes for purposes of this subsection.
"(2) ELIGIBLE EMPLOYER-SPONSORED PLAN.-The term
`eligible employer-sponsored plan' means, with respect to any
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employee, a group health plan or group health insurance coverage offered by an employer to the employee which is-"(A) a governmental plan (within the meaning of section 2791(d)(8) of the Public Health Service Act), or
"(B) any other plan or coverage offered in the small
or large group market within a State.
Such term shall include a grandfathered health plan described
in paragraph (1)(D) offered in a group market.
"(3) EXCEPTED BENEFITS NOT TREATED AS MINIMUM ESSENTIAL COVERAGE.--The term `minimum essential coverage' shall
not include health insurance coverage which consists of coverage of excepted benefits-

"(A) described in paragraph (1) of subsection (c) of
section 2791 of the Public Health Service Act; or
"(B) described in paragraph (2), (3), or (4) of such
subsection if the benefits are provided under a separate
policy, certificate, or contract of insurance.
"(4) INDIVIDUALS RESIDING OUTSIDE UNITED STATES OR RESIDENTS OF TERRITORIES.-Any applicable individual shall be
treated as having minimum essential coverage for any month--

"(A) if such month occurs during any period described
in subparagraph (A) or (B) of section 911(d)(1) which is
applicable to the individual, or
"(B) if such individual is a bona fide resident of any
possession of the United States (as determined under section 937(a)) for such month.
"(5) INSURANCE-RELATED TERMS.-Any term used in this
section which is also used in title I of the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act shall have the same meaning as when
used in such title.
"(g) ADMINISTRATION AND PROCEDURE.--

"(1) IN GENERAL.--The penalty provided by this section
shall be paid upon notice and demand by the Secretary, and
except as provided in paragraph (2), shall be assessed and
collected in the same manner as an assessable penalty under
subchapter B of chapter 68.
"(2) SPECIAL RULES.--Notwithstanding any other provision
of law-"(A) WAIVER OF CRIMINAL PENALTIES.-In the case of
any failure by a taxpayer to timely pay any penalty imposed
by this section, such taxpayer shall not be subject to any
criminal prosecution or penalty with respect to such failure.
"(B) LIMITATIONS ON LIENS AND LEVIES.-The Secretary
shall not-"(i) file notice of lien with respect to any property
of a taxpayer by reason of any failure to pay the
penalty imposed by this section, or
"(ii) levy on any such property with respect to
such failure.".
(c) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.-The table of chapters for subtitle
D of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by inserting
after the item relating to chapter 47 the following new item:
"CHAPTER 4$-MAINTENANCE OF MINIMUM ESSENTIAL COVERAGE.".

(d) EFFECTIVE DATE.-The amendments made by this section 26 USC 5000A
shall apply to taxable years ending after December 31, 2013. note.
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(4) Section 1421(f) of this Act is amended by striking "2010" 26 USC 38 note.
both places it appears and inserting "2009".
(5) The amendments made by this subsection shall take effect 26 USC 45R note.
as if included in the enactment of section 1421 of this Act.
(U Part I of subtitle E of title I of this Act is amended by
adding at the end of subpart B, the following:
"SEC. 1416. STUDY OF GEOGRAPHIC VARIATION IN APPLICATION OF
FPL.

"(a) IN GENERAL.-The Secretary shall conduct a study to
examine the feasibility and implication of adjusting the application
of the Federal poverty level under this subtitle (and the amendments made by this subtitle) for different geographic areas so
as to reflect the variations in cost-of-living among different areas
within the United States. If the Secretary determines that an Determination.
adjustment is feasible, the study should include a methodology
to make such an adjustment. Not later than January 1, 2013, Deadline.
the Secretary shall submit to Congress a report on such study Reports.
and shall include such recommendations as the Secretary deter- Rohs mendamines appropriate.
"(b) INCLUSION OF TERRITORIES.-

"(1) IN GENERAL.-The Secretary shall ensure that the
study under subsection (a) covers the territories of the United
States and that special attention is paid to the disparity that
exists among poverty levels and the cost of living in such
territories and to the impact of such disparity on efforts to
expand health coverage and ensure health care.
"(2) TERRITORIES DEFINED.-In this subsection, the term
`territories of the United States' includes the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, Guam, the
Northern Mariana Islands, and any other territory or possession
of the United States.".
SEC. 10106. AMENDMENTS TO SUBTITLE F.

(a) Section 1501(a)(2) of this Act is amended to read as follows: 42 USC 18091.
"(2) EFFECTS ON THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND INTERSTATE
COMMERCE.-The effects described in this paragraph are the

following:
"(A) The requirement regulates activity that is commercial and economic in nature: economic and financial
decisions about how and when health care is paid for,
and when health insurance is purchased. In the absence
of the requirement, some individuals would make an economic and financial decision to forego health insurance
coverage and attempt to self insure, which increases financial risks to households and medical providers.
"(B) Health insurance and health care services are
a significant part of the national economy. National health
spending is projected to increase from $2,500,000,000,000,
or 17.6 percent of the economy, in 2009 to
$4,700,000,000,000 in 2019. Private health insurance
spending is projected to be $854,000,000,000 in 2009, and
pays for medical supplies, drugs, and equipment that are
shipped in interstate commerce. Since most health insurance is sold by national or regional health insurance companies, health insurance is sold in interstate commerce and
claims payments flow through interstate commerce.
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"(C) The requirement, together with the other provisions of this Act, will add millions of new consumers to
the health insurance market, increasing the supply of, and
demand for, health care services, and will increase the
number and share of Americans who are insured.
"(D) The requirement achieves near-universal coverage
by building upon and strengthening the private employerbased health insurance system, which covers 176,000,000
Americans nationwide. In Massachusetts, a similar requirement has strengthened private employer-based coverage;
despite the economic downturn, the number of workers
offered employer-based coverage has actually increased.
"(E) The economy loses up to $207,000,000,000 a year
because of the poorer health and shorter lifespan of the
uninsured. By significantly reducing the number of the
uninsured, the requirement, together with the other provisions of this Act, will significantly reduce this economic
cost.
"(F) The cost of providing uncompensated care to the
uninsured was $43,000,000,000 in 2008. To pay for this
cost, health care providers pass on the cost to private
insurers, which pass on the cost to families. This costshifting increases family premiums by on average over
$1,000 a year. By significantly reducing the number of
the uninsured, the requirement, together with the other
provisions of this Act, will lower health insurance premiums.
"(G) 62 percent of all personal bankruptcies are caused
in part by medical expenses. By significantly increasing
health insurance coverage, the requirement, together with
the other provisions of this Act, will improve financial
security for families.
"(H) Under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.), the Public Health
Service Act (42 U.S.C. 201 et seq.), and this Act, the Federal
Government has a significant role in regulating health
insurance. The requirement is an essential part of this
larger regulation of economic activity, and the absence
of the requirement would undercut Federal regulation of
the health insurance market.
"(I) Under sections 2704 and 2705 of the Public Health
Service Act (as added by section 1201 of this Act), if there
were no requirement, many individuals would wait to purchase health insurance until they needed care. By significantly increasing health insurance coverage, the requirement, together with the other provisions of this Act, will
minimize this adverse selection and broaden the health
insurance risk pool to include healthy individuals, which
will lower health insurance premiums. The requirement
is essential to creating effective health insurance markets
in which improved health insurance products that are
guaranteed issue and do not exclude coverage of preexisting conditions can be sold.
"(J) Administrative costs for private health insurance,
which were $90,000,000,000 in 2006, are 26 to 30 percent
of premiums in the current individual and small group
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markets. By significantly increasing health insurance coverage and the size of purchasing pools, which will increase
economies of scale, the requirement, together with the other
provisions of this Act, will significantly reduce administrative costs and lower health insurance premiums. The
requirement is essential to creating effective health insurance markets that do not require underwriting and eliminate its associated administrative costs.".
(b)(1) Section 5000A(b)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,
as added by section 1501(b) of this Act, is amended to read as 26 USC 5000A.
follows:
"(1) IN GENERAL.---If a taxpayer who is an applicable individual, or an applicable individual for whom the taxpayer is
liable under paragraph (3), fails to meet the requirement of
subsection (a) for 1 or more months, then, except as provided
in subsection (e), there is hereby imposed on the taxpayer
a penalty with respect to such failures in the amount determined under subsection (c).".

(2) Paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 5000A(c) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as so added, are amended
to read as follows:
"(1) IN GENERAL.-The amount of the penalty imposed by
this section on any taxpayer for any taxable year with respect
to failures described in subsection (b)(1) shall be equal to the
lesser of-

"(A) the sum of the monthly penalty amounts determined under paragraph (2) for months in the taxable year
during which 1 or more such failures occurred, or
"(B) an amount equal to the national average premium
for qualified health plans which have a bronze level of
coverage, provide coverage for the applicable family size
involved, and are offered through Exchanges for plan years
beginning in the calendar year with or within which the
taxable year ends.
"(2) MONTHLY PENALTY AMOUNTS.-For purposes of paragraph (1)(A), the monthly penalty amount with respect to any
taxpayer for any month during which any failure described
in subsection (b)(1) occurred is an amount equal to 1/12 of
the greater of the following amounts:
"(A) FLAT DOLLAR AMOUNT.--An amount equal to the
lesser of-

"(i) the sum of the applicable dollar amounts for
all individuals with respect to whom such failure
occurred during such month, or
"(ii) 300 percent of the applicable dollar amount
(determined without regard to paragraph (3)(C)) for
the calendar year with or within which the taxable
year ends.
"(B) PERCENTAGE OF INCOME.--An amount equal to
the following percentage of the taxpayer's household income
for the taxable year:
"(i) 0.5 percent for taxable years beginning in 2014.
"(ii) 1.0 percent for taxable years beginning in
2015.

"(iii) 2.0 percent for taxable years beginning after
2015.".
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(3) Section 5000A(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,
26 USC 5000A. as added by section 1501(b) of this Act, is amended by striking
"$350" and inserting "$495".
(c) Section 5000A(d)(2)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986, as added by section 1501(b) of this Act, is amended to read
as follows:
"(A) RELIGIOUS CONSCIENCE EXEMPTION.-Such term
shall not include any individual for any month if such
individual has in effect an exemption under section
1311(d)(4)(H) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act which certifies that such individual is-

"(i) a member of a recognized religious sect or
division thereof which is described in section
1402(g)(1), and
"(ii) an adherent of established tenets or teachings
of such sect or division as described in such section.".
(d) Section 5000A(e)(1)(C) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986, as added by section 1501(b) of this Act, is amended to read
as follows:
"(C) SPECIAL RULES FOR INDIVIDUALS RELATED TO
EMPLOYEES.--For purposes of subparagraph (B)(i), if an
applicable individual is eligible for minimum essential coverage through an employer by reason of a relationship
to an employee, the determination under subparagraph
(A) shall be made by reference to required contribution
of the employee.".

(e) Section 4980H(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,
26 USC 4980H. as added by section 1513(a) of this Act, is amended to read as
follows:
"(b) LARGE EMPLOYERS WITH WAITING PERIODS EXCEEDING 60
DAYS.-

"(1) IN GENERAL.-In the case of any applicable large
employer which requires an extended waiting period to enroll
in any minimum essential coverage under an employer-sponsored plan (as defined in section 5000A(f)(2)), there is hereby
imposed on the employer an assessable payment of $600 for
each full-time employee of the employer to whom the extended
waiting period applies.
Definition. "(2) EXTENDED WAITING PERIOD.-The term `extended
waiting period' means any waiting period (as defined in section
2701(b)(4) of the Public Health Service Act) which exceeds
60 days.".

(0(1) Subparagraph (A) of section 4980H(d)(4) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, as added by section 1513(a) of this Act,
is amended by inserting ", with respect to any month," after
"means".
(2) Section 4980H(d)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,
as added by section 1513(a) of this Act, is amended by adding
at the end the following:
"(D) APPLICATION TO CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
EMPLOYERS.-In the case of any employer the substantial
annual gross receipts of which are attributable to the
construction industry--

"(i) subparagraph (A) shall be applied by substituting `who employed an average of at least 5 fulltime employees on business days during the preceding
calendar year and whose annual payroll expenses
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exceed $ 250,000 for such preceding calendar year' for
`who employed an average of at least 50 full-time
employees on business days during the preceding calendar year', and
"(ii) subparagraph (B) shall be applied by substituting `5' for ` 50'.".
(3) The amendment made by paragraph ( 2) shall apply to
months beginning after December 31, 2013.
(g) Section 6056 ( b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
added by section 1514( a) of the Act, is amended by adding at
the end the following new flush sentence:
"The Secretary shall have the authority to review the accuracy
of the information provided under this subsection , including the
applicable large employer 's share under paragraph (2)(C)(iv).".

Applicability.
26 USC 4980H
note.
26 USC 6056.

SEC. 10107. AMENDMENTS TO SUBTITLE G.

(a) Section 1562 of this Act is amended , in the amendment
made by subsection (a)(2)(B)(iii ), by striking "subpart 1" and
inserting "subparts I and II"; and
(b) Subtitle G of title I of this Act is amended(1) by redesignating section 1562 (as amended) as section
1563; and
(2) by inserting after section 1561 the following:
"SEC. 1562 . GAO STUDY REGARDING THE RATE OF DENIAL OF COVERAGE AND ENROLLMENT BY HEALTH INSURANCE
ISSUERS AND GROUP HEALTH PLANS.

"(a) IN GENERAL.-The Comptroller General of the United
States (referred to in this section as the `Comptroller General')
shall conduct a study of the incidence of denials of coverage for
medical services and denials of applications to enroll in health
insurance plans , as described in subsection (b), by group health
plans and health insurance issuers.

42 USC
300gg-21.

26 USC 9815; 29
USC 1185d; 42
USC 300gg-1300gg-3,
300gg-9,
300gg-11,
300gg-12,
300gg-21300gg-23,
300gg-25300gg-28,
300gg-62,
300gg-91 , 18120.

"(b) DATA.-

"(1) IN GENERAL .-In conducting the study described in
subsection (a), the Comptroller General shall consider samples
of data concerning the following:

"(A)(i) denials of coverage for medical services to a
plan enrollees , by the types of services for which such
coverage was denied; and
"(ii) the reasons such coverage was denied; and
"(B)(i) incidents in which group health plans and health
insurance issuers deny the application of an individual
to enroll in a health insurance plan offered by such group
health plan or issuer; and
"(ii) the reasons such applications are denied.
"(2) SCOPE OF DATA."(A) FAVORABLY RESOLVED DISPUTES.-The data that
the Comptroller General considers under paragraph (1)
shall include data concerning denials of coverage for medical services and denials of applications for enrollment in
a plan by a group health plan or health insurance issuer,
where such group health plan or health insurance issuer
later approves such coverage or application.
"(B) ALL HEALTH PLANS.-The study under this section
shall consider data from varied group health plans and
health insurance plans offered by health insurance issuers,
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Advisory Panel for the purpose of examining and advising
the Secretary and Congress on workforce issues related to
personal care attendant workers , including with respect to the
adequacy of the number of such workers, the salaries, wages,
and benefits of such workers, and access to the services provided
by such workers.
(2) MEMBERSHIP .- In appointing members to the Personal
Care Attendants Workforce Advisory Panel , the Secretary shall
ensure that such members include the following:

(A) Individuals with disabilities of all ages.
(B) Senior individuals.
(C) Representatives of individuals with disabilities.
(D) Representatives of senior individuals.
(E) Representatives of workforce and labor organizations.

(F) Representatives of home and community-based
service providers.
(G) Representatives of assisted living providers.
(d) INCLUSION OF INFORMATION ON SUPPLEMENTAL COVERAGE
IN THE NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE FOR LONG- TERM CARE INFORMATION; EXTENSION OF FUNDING.- Section 6021 (d) of the Deficit
Reduction Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C.1396p note ) is amended-

(1) in paragraph (2)(A)(A) in clause (ii), by striking "and" at the end;
(B) in clause (iii), by striking the period at the end
and inserting "; and"; and
(C) by adding at the end the following:
"(iv) include information regarding the CLASS program established under title XXXII of the Public
Health Service Act and coverage available for purchase
through a Exchange established under section 1311
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act that
is supplemental coverage to the benefits provided
under a CLASS Independence Benefit Plan under that
program , and information regarding how benefits provided under a CLASS Independence Benefit Plan differ
from disability insurance benefits."; and
(2) in paragraph (3), by striking "2010" and inserting
"2015".
(e) EFFECTIVE DATE. -The amendments made by subsections
(a), (b), and (d) take effect on January 1, 2011.
(0 RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.-Nothing in this title or the amendments made by this title are intended to replace or displace public
or private disability insurance benefits , including such benefits
that are for income replacement.

42 USC 30011
note.
42 USC 30011
note.

TITLE IX-REVENUE PROVISIONS
Subtitle A--Revenue Offset Provisions
SEC. 9001 , EXCISE TAX ON HIGH COST EMPLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTH
COVERAGE.

(a) IN GENERAL.-Chapter 43 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986, as amended by section 1513, is amended by adding at
the end the following:
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26 USC 49801. "SEC. 49801 .

EXCISE TAX ON HIGH COST EMPLOYER-SPONSORED
HEALTH COVERAGE.

"(a) IMPOSITION OF TAX.-If-

"(1) an employee is covered under any applicable employersponsored coverage of an employer at any time during a taxable
period, and
"(2) there is any excess benefit with respect to the coverage,
there is hereby imposed a tax equal to 40 percent of the excess
benefit.
"(b) EXCESS BENEFIT.-For purposes of this sectionDefinition , "(1) IN GENERAL.-The term ` excess benefit' means, with
respect to any applicable employer-sponsored coverage made
available by an employer to an employee during any taxable
period , the sum of the excess amounts determined under paragraph ( 2) for months during the taxable period.
"(2) MONTHLY EXCESS AMOUNT .-The excess amount determined under this paragraph for any month is the excess (if
any) of-

"(A) the aggregate cost of the applicable employersponsored coverage of the employee for the month, over
"(B) an amount equal to /12 of the annual limitation
under paragraph (3) for the calendar year in which the
month occurs.
"(3) ANNUAL LIMITATION.- For purposes of this subsection"(A) IN GENERAL.-The annual limitation under this
paragraph for any calendar year is the dollar limit determined under subparagraph (C) for the calendar year.
"(B) APPLICABLE ANNUAL LIMITATION.- The annual
limitation which applies for any month shall be determined
on the basis of the type of coverage ( as determined under
subsection (0(1)) provided to the employee by the employer
as of the beginning of the month.
"(C) APPLICABLE DOLLAR LIMIT.-Except as provided
in subparagraph (D)-

"(i) 2013 .-In the case of 2013, the dollar limit
under this subparagraph is-"(I) in the case of an employee with self only
coverage, $8,500, and
"(II) in the case of an em ployee with coverage
other than self -only covera g e > $23 > 000.
"(ii) EXCEPTION FOR CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS.-In the
case of an individual who is a qualified retiree or
who participates in a plan sponsored by an employer
the majority of whose employees are engaged in a
high-risk profession or employed to repair or install
electrical or telecommunications lines-

"(I) the dollar amount in clause (i)(I) (determined after the application of subparagraph (D))
shall be increased by $1,350, and
"(II) the dollar amount in clause (i)(II) (determined after the application of subparagraph (D))
shall be increased by $3,000.
"(iii) SUBSEQUENT YEARS.-In the case of any calendar year after 2013, each of the dollar amounts
under clauses (i) and (ii) shall be increased to the
amount equal to such amount as in effect for the
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"(B) the amount of any salary reduction contributions
to a flexible spending arrangement (within the meaning
of section 125).".
26 USC 6051
( b) EFFECTIVE DATE .-The amendments made by this section
note. shall apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2010.
SEC. 9003. DISTRIBUTIONS FOR MEDICINE QUALIFIED ONLY IF FOR
PRESCRIBED DRUG OR INSULIN.

26 USC 223 .

26 USC 220 .

26 USC 106 .

(a) HSAs.-Subparagraph (A) of section 223(d )( 2) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the following: "Such term shall include an amount paid for medicine
or a drug only if such medicine or drug is a prescribed drug
(determined without regard to whether such drug is available without a prescription) or is insulin.".
(b) ARCHER MSAS .-Subparagraph (A) of section 220(d)(2) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the
end the following: "Such term shall include an amount paid for
medicine or a drug only if such medicine or drug is a prescribed
drug ( determined without regard to whether such drug is available
without a prescription) or is insulin.".
(c) HEALTH FLEXIBLE SPENDING ARRANGEMENTS AND HEALTH
REIMBURSEMENT ARRANGEMENTS .-Section 106 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the following
new subsection:
"U) REIMBURSEMENTS FOR MEDICINE RESTRICTED TO PRESCRIBED DRUGS AND INSULIN .-For purposes of this section and
section 105, reimbursement for expenses incurred for a medicine
or a drug shall be treated as a reimbursement for medical expenses
only if such medicine or drug is a prescribed drug ( determined
without regard to whether such drug is available without a prescription) or is insulin.".
(d) EFFECTIVE DATES.-

26 USC 220 note. (1 ) DISTRIBUTIONS FROM SAVINGS ACCOUNTS .-The amendments made by subsections ( a) and (b) shall apply to amounts
paid with respect to taxable years beginning after December
31, 2010.
26 USC 106 note. (2) REIMBURSEMENTS .-The amendment made by subsection ( c) shall apply to expenses incurred with respect to
taxable years beginning after December 31, 2010.
SEC. 9004. INCREASE IN ADDITIONAL TAX ON DISTRIBUTIONS FROM
HSAS AND ARCHER MSAS NOT USED FOR QUALIFIED
MEDICAL EXPENSES.

(a) HSAS. -Section 223 (f)(4)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986 is amended by striking "10 percent" and inserting "20
percent".
(b) ARCHER MSAS .-Section 220 (f)(4)(A) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 is amended by striking " 15 percent" and inserting
"20 percent".
26 USC 220 note. (c) EFFECTIVE DATE. -The amendments made by this section
shall apply to distributions made after December 31, 2010.
SEC. 9005 . LIMITATION ON HEALTH FLEXIBLE SPENDING ARRANGEMENTS UNDER CAFETERIA PLANS.

26 USC 125 .

(a) IN GENERAL .-Section 125 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986 is amended-

(1) by redesignating subsections (i) and (j) as subsections
(j) and (k), respectively, and
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remuneration' means , with respect to any applicable individual for any disqualified taxable year , the aggregate
amount allowable as a deduction under this chapter for
such taxable year ( determined without regard to this subsection ) for remuneration ( as defined in paragraph (4) without regard to subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D) thereof) for
services performed by such individual (whether or not
during the taxable year). Such term shall not include any
deferred deduction remuneration with respect to services
performed during the disqualified taxable year.
"(E) DEFERRED DEDUCTION REMUNERATION .-For purposes of this paragraph, the term `deferred deduction remuneration' means remuneration which would be applicable
individual remuneration for services performed in a disqualified taxable year but for the fact that the deduction
under this chapter (determined without regard to this paragraph ) for such remuneration is allowable in a subsequent
taxable year.
"(F) APPLICABLE INDIVIDUAL.-For purposes of this
paragraph , the term `applicable individual ' means, with
respect to any covered health insurance provider for any
disqualified taxable year , any individual-

"(i) who is an officer, director, or employee in such
taxable year, or
"(ii) who provides services for or on behalf of such
covered health insurance provider during such taxable
year.
"(G) COORDINATION .-Rules similar to the rules of subparagraphs (F) and ( G) of paragraph (4) shall apply for
purposes of this paragraph.
"(H) REGULATORY AUTHORITY.-The Secretary may prescribe such guidance , rules , or regulations as are necessary
to carry out the purposes of this paragraph.".
26 USC 162 note. (b) EFFECTIVE DATE. -The amendment made by this section
shall apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2009,
with respect to services performed after such date.
SEC. 9015. ADDITIONAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE TAX ON HIGH - INCOME
TAXPAYERS.
26 USC 3101.

(a) FICA.(1) IN GENERAL.-Section 3101(b) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 is amended(A) by striking "In addition" and inserting the following:
"(1) IN GENERAL .-In addition",

(B) by striking "the following percentages of the" and
inserting " 1.45 percent of the",
(C) by striking "( as defined in section 3121(b))-" and
all that follows and inserting "(as defined in section
3121 (b)).", and
(D) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
"(2) ADDITIONAL TAX.-In addition to the tax imposed by
paragraph ( 1) and the preceding subsection , there is hereby
imposed on every taxpayer (other than a corporation , estate,
or trust) a tax equal to 0.5 percent of wages which are received
with respect to employment (as defined in section 3121(b))
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during any taxable year beginning after December 31, 2012,
and which are in excess of"(A) in the case of a joint return, $250,000, and
"(B) in any other case, $200,000.".
(2) COLLECTION OF TAX.-Section 3102 of the Internal Rev-

enue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the fol- 26 USC 3102.
lowing new subsection:
"(f) SPECIAL RULES FOR ADDITIONAL TAx.-

"(1) IN GENERAL.-In the case of any tax imposed by section
3101(b)(2), subsection (a) shall only apply to the extent to
which the taxpayer receives wages from the employer in excess
of $200,000, and the employer may disregard the amount of
wages received by such taxpayer's spouse.
"(2) COLLECTION OF AMOUNTS NOT WITHHELD.-To the
extent that the amount of any tax imposed by section 3101(b)(2)
is not collected by the employer, such tax shall be paid by
the employee.
"(3) TAX PAID BY RECIPIENT.-If an employer, in violation
of this chapter, fails to deduct and withhold the tax imposed
by section 3101(b)(2) and thereafter the tax is paid by the
employee, the tax so required to be deducted and withheld
shall not be collected from the employer, but this paragraph
shall in no case relieve the employer from liability for any
penalties or additions to tax otherwise applicable in respect
of such failure to deduct and withhold.".

(b) SECA.(1) IN GENERAL.-Section 1401(b) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 is amended- 26 USC 1401.
(A) by striking "In addition" and inserting the following:
"(1) IN GENERAL.-In addition", and

(B) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
"(2) ADDITIONAL TAX."(A) IN GENERAL.-In addition to the tax imposed by
paragraph (1) and the preceding subsection, there is hereby
imposed on every taxpayer (other than a corporation,
estate, or trust) for each taxable year beginning after
December 31, 2012, a tax equal to 0.5 percent of the selfemployment income for such taxable year which is in excess
of-

"(i) in the case of a joint return, $250,000, and
"(ii) in any other case, $200,000.
"(B) COORDINATION WITH FICA.-The amounts under
clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (A) shall be reduced
(but not below zero) by the amount of wages taken into
account in determining the tax imposed under section
3121(b)(2) with respect to the taxpayer.".
(2) NO DEDUCTION FOR ADDITIONAL TAX.-

(A) IN GENERAL.-Section 164(f) of such Code is
amended by inserting "(other than the taxes imposed by
section 1401(b)(2))" after "section 1401)".
(B) DEDUCTION FOR NET EARNINGS FROM SELF-EMPLOYMENT.-Subparagraph (B) of section 1402(a)(12) is amended 26 USC 1402.
by inserting "(determined without regard to the rate
imposed under paragraph (2) of section 1401(b))" after "for
such year".
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26 USC 164 note. (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.--The amendments made by this section
shall apply with respect to remuneration received, and taxable
years beginning , after December 31, 2012.
SEC. 9016. MODIFICATION OF SECTION 833 TREATMENT OF CERTAIN
HEALTH ORGANIZATIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL.- Subsection (c) of section 833 of the Internal
26 USC 833. Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the following
new paragraph:
"(5) NONAPPLICATION OF SECTION IN CASE OF LOW MEDICAL
LOSS RATIO.-Notwithstanding the preceding paragraphs, this
section shall not apply to any organization unless such
organization' s percentage of total premium revenue expended
on reimbursement for clinical services provided to enrollees
under its policies during such taxable year (as reported under
section 2718 of the Public Health Service Act) is not less than
85 percent.".

amendment made by this section
shall apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2009.

26 USC 853 note. (b ) EFFECTIVE DATE .-The

SEC. 9017 . EXCISE TAX ON ELECTIVE COSMETIC MEDICAL PROCEDURES.

(a) IN GENERAL.-Subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986 , as amended by this Act, is amended by adding at the
end the following new chapter:

"CHAPTER 49-ELECTIVE COSMETIC MEDICAL
PROCEDURES
"Sec. 5000B. Imposition of tax on elective cosmetic medical procedures.
26 USC 5000B. " SEC. 5000B . IMPOSITION OF TAX ON ELECTIVE COSMETIC MEDICAL
PROCEDURES.
"(a) IN GENERAL.-There is hereby imposed on any cosmetic

surgery and medical procedure a tax equal to 5 percent of the
amount paid for such procedure (determined without regard to
this section), whether paid by insurance or otherwise.
"(b) COSMETIC SURGERY AND MEDICAL PROCEDURE.-For purposes of this section , the term ` cosmetic surgery and medical procedure ' means any cosmetic surgery (as defined in section 213(d)( 9)(B))
or other similar procedure which-

"(1) is performed by a licensed medical professional, and
"(2) is not necessary to ameliorate a deformity arising
from, or directly related to , a congenital abnormality , a personal
injury resulting from an accident or trauma , or disfiguring
disease.
"(c) PAYMENT OF TAx."(1) IN GENERAL.-The tax imposed by this section shall
be paid by the individual on whom the procedure is performed.
"(2) COLLECTION.-Every person receiving a payment for

procedures on which a tax is imposed under subsection (a)
shall collect the amount of the tax from the individual on
whom the procedure is performed and remit such tax quarterly
to the Secretary at such time and in such manner as provided
by the Secretary.
"(3) SECONDARY LIABILITY.-Where any tax imposed by subsection ( a) is not paid at the time payments for cosmetic surgery
and medical procedures are made, then to the extent that
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(C) by striking subclause ( III) and inserting the following:
"(III) 73 percent in the case of an eligible
insured whose household income is more than 200
percent but not more than 250 percent of the poverty line for a family of the size involved; and
"(IV) 70 percent in the case of an eligible
insured whose household income is more than 250
percent but not more than 400 percent of the poverty line for a family of the size involved."; and
(2) in paragraph (2)(A) in subparagraph (A)(i) by striking "90" and inserting "94"; and
(ii) by striking "and";

(B) in subparagraph (B)(i) by striking "80" and inserting "87"; and
(ii) by striking the period and inserting "; and";
and
(C) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following
new subparagraph:
"(C) in the case of an eligible insured whose household
income is more than 200 percent but not more than 250
percent of the poverty line for a family of the size involved,
increase the plan' s share of the total allowed costs of benefits provided under the plan to 73 percent of such costs.".
SEC. 1002 . INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY.

Ante, p. 244, 907 ,

(a) AMOUNTS. -Section 5000A(c) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986 , as added by section 1501 (b) of the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act and amended by section 10106 of such
Act, is amended(1) in paragraph ( 2)(B)(A) in the matter preceding clause (i), by(i) inserting "the excess of before "the taxpayer's
household income"; and
(ii) inserting "for the taxable year over the amount
of gross income specified in section 6012(a)(1) with
respect to the taxpayer " before "for the taxable year";
(B) in clause (i), by striking "0.5" and inserting "1.0";
(C) in clause (ii), by striking " 1.0" and inserting "2.0";
and
(D) in clause (iii), by striking "2.0" and inserting "2.5";
and
(2) in paragraph (3)-

(A) in subparagraph (A), by striking "$750" and
inserting "$695";
(B) in subparagraph (B), by striking "$495" and
inserting "$325"; and
(C) in subparagraph (D)(i) in the matter preceding clause (i), by striking
"$750" and inserting "$695"; and
(ii) in clause (i), by striking "$750" and inserting
"$695".
(b) THRESHOLD.-Section 5000A of such Code, as so added
and amended, is amended-

(1) by striking subsection (c)(4)(D); and
(2) in subsection (e)(2)-
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(A) by striking "UNDER 100 PERCENT OF POVERTY LINE"
and inserting "BELOW FILING THRESHOLD"; and

(B) by striking all that follows "less than" and inserting
"the amount of gross income specified in section 6012(a)(1)
with respect to the taxpayer.".
SEC. 1003 . EMPLOYER RESPONSIBILITY.

(a) PAYMENT CALCULATION.- Subparagraph (D) of subsection
(d)(2) of section 498011 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,
as added by section 1513 of the Patient Protection and Affordable

Care Act and amended by section 10106 of such Act, is amended
to read as follows:

Ante, p. 253, 907.

"(D) APPLICATION OF EMPLOYER SIZE TO ASSESSABLE
PENALTIES.-

"(i) IN GENERAL.-The number of individuals
employed by an applicable large employer as full-time
employees during any month shall be reduced by 30
solely for purposes of calculating"(I) the assessable payment under subsection
(a), or

"(II) the overall limitation under subsection
(b)(2).
"(ii) AGGREGATION.-In the case of persons treated
as 1 employer under subparagraph (C)(i), only 1 reduction under subclause (I) or (II) shall be allowed with
respect to such persons and such reduction shall be
allocated among such persons ratably on the basis
of the number of full-time employees employed by each
such person.".
(b) APPLICABLE PAYMENT AMOUNT.-Section 4980H of such
Code, as so added and amended, is amended(1) in the flush text following subsection (c)(1)(B), by
striking "400 percent of the applicable payment amount" and
inserting " an amount equal to 1/12 of $3,000";

(2) in subsection (d)(1), by striking "$ 750" and inserting
"$2,000"; and
(3) in subsection (d)(5)(A), in the matter preceding clause
(i), by striking " subsection (b)(2) and ( d)(1)" and inserting "subsection (b) and paragraph (1)".
(c) COUNTING PART-TIME WORKERS IN SETTING THE THRESHOLD
FOR EMPLOYER RESPONSIBILITY .--Section 4980H (d)(2) of such Code,
as so added and amended and as amended by subsection (a), is
amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
"(E) FULL-TIME EQUIVALENTS TREATED AS FULL-TIME
EMPLOYEES.-Solely for purposes of determining whether
an employer is an applicable large employer under this
paragraph , an employer shall, in addition to the number
of full-time employees for any month otherwise determined,
include for such month a number of full-time employees
determined by dividing the aggregate number of hours
of service of employees who are not full -time employees
for the month by 120.".
(d) ELIMINATING WAITING PERIOD ASSESSMENT .-Section 4980H
of such Code, as so added and amended and as amended by the
preceding subsections, is amended by striking subsection (b) and
redesignating subsections ( c), (d), and (e) as subsections (b), (c),
and (d), respectively.
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SEC. 1004 . INCOME DEFINITIONS.
(a) MODIFIED ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME.-

(1) IN GENERAL.-The following provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 are each amended by striking "modified
gross " each place it appears and inserting "modified adjusted
gross":
(A) Clauses (i) and (ii) of section 36B(d)(2)(A), as added
by section 1401 of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Ante, p. 213. Care Act.

(B) Section 6103(1)(21)(A)(iv ), as added by section 1414
Ante, p. 236, of such Act.
(C) Clauses ( i) and (ii) of section 5000A(c)(4), as added
Ante, p . 244. by section 1501 (b) of such Act.
(2) DEFINITION.-

(A) Section 36B(d)( 2)(B) of such Code, as so added,
is amended to read as follows:
"(B) MODIFIED ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME.-The term
`modified adjusted gross income' means adjusted gross
income increased by-

"(i) any amount excluded from gross income under
section 911, and
"(ii) any amount of interest received or accrued
by the taxpayer during the taxable year which is
exempt from tax.".
(B) Section 5000A(c)(4)(C) of such Code, as so added,
is amended to read as follows:
"(C) MODIFIED ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME.-The term
`modified adjusted gross income' means adjusted gross
income increased by-

"(i) any amount excluded from gross income under
section 911, and
"(ii) any amount of interest received or accrued
by the taxpayer during the taxable year which is
exempt from tax.".
(b) MODIFIED ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME DEFINITION.-

(1) MEDICAID .-Section 1902 of the Social Security Act
(42 U.S . C. 1396a) is amended by striking "modified gross
income" each place it appears in the text and headings of
the following provisions and inserting "modified adjusted gross
income":
(A) Paragraph ( 14) of subsection ( e), as added by section 2002(a) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act.
(B) Subsection (gg)(4)(A), as added by section 2001(b)
of such Act.
(2) CHIP.-

(A) STATE PLAN REQUIREMENTS .-Section
2102(b)(1)(B)(v) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.
1397bb (b)(1)(B)(v )), as added by section 2101 ( d)(1) of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, is amended
by striking "modified gross income " and inserting "modified
adjusted gross income".
(B) PLAN ADMINISTRATION .-Section 2107(e)(1)(E) of the.
Social Security Act (42 U. S.C. 1397gg(e)(1)(E)), as added
by section 2101 ( d)(2) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, is amended by striking "modified gross
income" and inserting "modified adjusted gross income".
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